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"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. 1., § 8, cl. 8.
In 1790, Congress enacted the first patent statute and imposed two
substantive requirements before a patent could issue: novelty and
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utility.' Administrators of the patent system, however, recognized from
the outset that patents ought not be granted for every trivial advance in
an art; some more substantial improvement was required In 1851, the
Court formally tied this third substantive requirement for patentability
to the language of the Constitution by distinguishing minor
improvements reflecting "the work of the skilful mechanic" from
substantial improvements reflecting "[the work] of the inventor." 4 For the
next hundred years, courts struggled to quantify and define the advance
necessary to qualify as the substantial improvement constitutionally
required, but the process of crafting a substantive rule from the word
"Inventors" proved to be difficult and ultimately unsatisfactory. As Judge
Learned Hand complained, the concept of invention was "as fugitive,
impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole
paraphernalia of legal concepts."5
In 1952, Congress formally incorporated this third requirement,
mandating substantial improvements, into section 103 of the patent stat-
ute.6 Yet rather than phrase the requirement in terms of whether the
advance constituted an "invention" or the work of an "Inventor," Con-
gress described the necessary advance in terms of whether the claimed
subject matter "would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art. ' 7 Although there was
some suggestion to the contrary in both the statutory language and the
legislative history,' the Court in 1966 held that section 103 "was in-
1. Patent Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
2. See, e.g., P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
237 (1936).
3. See Knight v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 14 F. Cas. 758, 759, (C.C. Md. 1840) (no.
7882) ("If, before his first patent ... the same principle, in the same combination, which he
describes as his improvement, was in public use, in ordinary carriages, upon public roads,
the plaintiff was not entitled to a patent for applying the same thing to railway carriages,
unless the improvements he claims contain something new and material, either in principle,
in combination, or in the mode of operation, in order to adapt it to its new use.") (emphasis
added); see also GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USE-
FUL INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 17 (Boston, Charles C. Little &
James Brown 1849).
4. Hotchldss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851).
5. Harries v. Air King Prods., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).
6. Patent Act of 1952, § 103, codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. 2000).
7. Id.
8. Two aspects of the statutory language were probably intended to redress excesses in
the Court's obviousness jurisprudence. First, the statutory language requires the determina-
tion of obviousness to be made with respect to "the subject matter as a whole," 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) (Supp. 2000), which was almost certainly a response to the Court's approach to
combination patents set forth in Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340
U.S. 147 (1950). Second, section 103 also states that "[p]atentability shall not be negatived
by the manner in which the invention was made," 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (Supp. 2000), which
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tended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the
Hotchkiss condition" and "was not intended by Congress to change the
general level of patentable invention." 9
This action by Congress effectively changed the name for this third
substantive requirement for patentability from "invention" to
"nonobviousness." The key issue, however, remained the same: How
much of an advance is required to support a patent? On this issue, the term
"obviousness" provided little more inherent guidance than "invention."
We know, following Graham v. John Deere Co. (and the language of sec-
tion 103), that obviousness is to be determined against a background of
the prior art, the differences between the claimed subject matter and the
prior art, and the ordinary level of skill in the art.'o We know that secon-
dary considerations, such as commercial success, long-felt but unsolved
needs, and the failures of others, are relevant." We also know that the
use of certain factors, such as hindsight, to demonstrate obviousness is
improper. 2 Despite these guidelines, the key issue of how much of an
advance is required remains curiously undefined. As a result, there is
wide variation in application of the nonobviousness requirement. Courts
apply the same approach for defining the obviousness inquiry and recite
the same factors and rules, but nevertheless reach widely divergent re-
sults as to the level of advance required. 3 Such divergent results create
substantial uncertainty regarding the availability and enforceability of
patents. There has also been recent concern that an inability to define
the level of advance required has led the Federal Circuit to abandon
largely enforcement of the nonobviousness requirement and to permit
patentability so long as there is some advance over the prior art. 4 Yet,
such a de facto elimination of the obviousness requirement invites the
creation of market power without offsetting public benefit.
was almost certainly a response to the "flash of creative genius" standard set forth in Cuno
Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90 (1941).
9. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
10. Id. at 17-18.
11. Id.; see also Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that analysis of nonobviousness must include evaluation of
secondary considerations where relevant evidence is present), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065
(1985).
12. See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998-99 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reversing find-
ing of obviousness where court concluded that "the Board fell into the hindsight trap").
13. Compare Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 766-69 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(affirming district court's ruling of obviousness that relied on combining old elements), with
Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 959-60 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (rejecting district court's ruling of obviousness as relying improperly on combining
old elements); see also infra text and accompanying notes 116-121.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 37-44.
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As patents expand into e-commerce and methods of doing business
more generally, both the uncertainty and the risk of unjustified market
power that the present approach generates suggest a need to rethink our
approach to nonobviousness. If courts fail to enforce the nonobvious-
ness requirement and allow an individual to obtain a patent for simply
implementing existing methods of doing business through a computer,
even where only trivial technical difficulties are presented, entire e-
markets might be handed over to patent holders with no concomitant
public benefit. If courts attempt to enforce the nonobviousness require-
ment, but leave undefined the extent of the advance required to establish
nonobviousness, wide variance in the doctrine's application to particular
cases will continue. The resulting uncertainty regarding patent enforce-
ability will substantially undermine the patent system's ability to
encourage innovation and serve the public interest more generally.
In an attempt to define the extent of the advance that should be re-
quired, this article reexamines the economic justifications for the
nonobviousness requirement and for the patent system more generally.
Traditionally, courts and commentators have justified the nonobvious-
ness requirement on the ground that patents are monopoly rights,
presumptively undesirable, and so require "drawing a line between the
things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent, and those which are not."' 5 Under this traditional perspective, pat-
ents, like monopolies more generally, impose' undesirable deadweight
losses. To minimize such losses, the traditional view suggests that we
should grant patents only to "those inventions which would not be dis-
closed or devised but for the inducement of a patent."' 6 Only for such
inventions are the benefits from the patent likely to outweigh the mo-
nopoly costs it generates. The nonobviousness requirement plays a
central role in this process. By requiring inventions to demonstrate a
significant level of technical advance before they may receive a patent,
the nonobviousness requirement helps separate those inventions that
would likely have been created, developed, and disclosed even in the
absence of a patent from those that would not. The requirement thereby
tends to ensure that only deserving inventions receive patents.
The Federal Circuit appears to have rejected this traditional,
"patent-as-monopoly" perspective. In its place, the Federal Circuit has
adopted a perspective in which patents are characterized simply as
property and are therefore not monopoly at all. From this perspective, a
15. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting Letter of Thomas Jeffer-
son to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), VI WRITINGS OF THOMIAS JEFFERSON 181
(Washington ed.)).
16. Id. at 11.
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patent on an invention is no different than the title on a piece of land.
Both forms of ownership enable the owner to exclude others from a de-
fined property, but neither is monopoly.1 7 First articulated by then-Chief
Judge Markey in a speech at the University of Chicago in April 1983,18
this "simply-property" perspective quickly became a prominent feature
of Federal Circuit jurisprudence.'9 The simply-property perspective is
not a mere rhetorical flourish nor is it a quibble over semantics. Rather,
it represents a fundamental challenge to the traditional perspective. By
rejecting the characterization of a patent as monopoly, the simply-
property perspective rejects the view that patents can impose dead-
weight losses. Absent the specter of these deadweight losses, the cost-
benefit equation associated with granting a patent shifts sharply in favor
of patents. And if patents do not generate monopolistic deadweight
losses, there appears to be little reason to "weed out" undeserving ad-
vances or to restrict patents to only those advances that would not have
occurred but for the inducement of a patent. To the contrary, under the
simply-property perspective, an individual who has contributed some-
thing new and useful would seem presumptively entitled to a property
right reflecting her contribution.
Although the simply-property perspective runs sharply contrary to
the Court's view of patents and to established economic analysis,0 the
simply-property perspective accurately predicts the changes that have
taken place and the continuing uncertainty in obviousness practice un-
der the Federal Circuit.21 The simply-property perspective also appears
fundamentally incompatible with the traditional perspective. Where one
sees monopoly, the other sees property. Before we can move forward on
17. See infra text accompanying notes 76-82.
18. See Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 331, 331-33
(1983).
19. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("Infringement having been established, it is contrary to the laws of property, of which the
patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's right to exclude others from use of his prop-
erty."); it re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1578 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton
Industrial Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852,
859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The essence of all property is the right to exclude .... "), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 828 (1985); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Union Carbide Corp. v. American Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1574 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Carl Schenck AG v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
20. It also appears to run sharply counter to the conventional understanding of the Pat-
ents and Copyrights Clause as both limit and grant of congressional power. See, e.g., Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("The Patent Clause itself
reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopo-
lies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science
and useful Arts.' ").
21. See infra text accompanying notes 110-120.
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e-commerce patent issues, we must determine whether these two per-
spectives can be reconciled or, at least, brought to a working
relationship. Given the Federal Circuit's apparent adoption of the sim-
ply-property perspective, only through such a reconciliation can we
hope to influence the Federal Circuit's direction on nonobviousness.
Without this reconciliation, continued thundering about the potential
monopoly costs of unjustified patents will prove unpersuasive, as such
arguments have no place within the simply-property perspective.2 Iden-
tifying the appropriate level of advance for the nonobviousness
requirement calls therefore for an examination of the normative struc-
ture of the simply-property perspective to see if that structure offers any
insight into nonobviousness's proper role.
The key, I believe, to reconciling these two perspectives and to de-
veloping a normatively persuasive model from the simply-property
perspective is to recall that the central purpose of any property regime,
from an economic perspective, is to ensure that scarce resources are al-
located to their highest value use. 3 In the patent context, the scarce
resource is creativity, by which I mean that skill, effort, and ability nec-
essary to invent and bring a new product to market. As a result, for the
patent system to make sense as a property regime, it must serve to allo-
cate creativity to those uses that are most valuable to society. In
defining the role of nonobviousness within such a property regime, the
question becomes whether the patent system will better promote alloca-
tive efficiency-that is the allocation of scarce resources to their highest
value use-by granting patents to all advances or only to some ad-
vances, and if only to some, which ones. To examine these questions, I
have developed and will present a simple model exploring the patent
system's role in allocating creativity among potential endeavors. De-
spite the initial thought that a simply-property perspective would justify
a patent for any advance in the art, this model helps demonstrate that
even under the simply-property perspective, only certain advances
should receive patents. To do otherwise and grant a patent for every ad-
vance in the art, would almost certainly lead individuals to devote their
creativity to less valuable uses and thereby frustrate the purpose of the
patent system as property regime.
When we use this model to define which advances should receive
patents, we find an answer surprisingly similar to that given by the tra-
ditional approach. Under a simply-property perspective, a patent should
22. See infra text and accompanying notes 103-108.
23. As Professor Baxter has explained, "[tlhis is the classic economic criterion of opti-
mal allocation.' William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 268 n.7 (1966).
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be awarded where the inventive costs associated with a new product or
process represent a substantial portion of the total cost of the invention
as marketed. This standard identifies those cases where the inventor is
particularly susceptible to free riding by copying competitors or to mar-
ket failure as a result of simultaneous invention and therefore needs the
added protection of a patent to ensure a fair opportunity to earn a return
on her creativity. Where this standard is satisfied, patent protection is
appropriate, but not otherwise. 4 To implement this policy analysis, we
should re-orient the nonobviousness inquiry away from asking whether
an invention is obvious in the abstract toward asking whether the inven-
tive expenditures actually present constitute a substantial fraction of the
claimed invention's market price. I recognize that conducting the pro-
posed analysis will raise some tough issues, such as what constitutes an
inventive expenditure. Furthermore, the analysis may prove difficult to
apply in some cases, for example where the claimed invention is not
sold separately or is discovered serendipitously in the course of research
directed at some other issue. Nevertheless, the proposed approach fo-
cuses attention on the relevant considerations far more precisely and
concretely than does the present nonobviousness inquiry. As a result,
the proposed approach should provide an objective, consistent, and sen-
sible guide to the nonobviousness issue in the vast majority of cases.
Two special cases warrant mention, however. First, we must be
careful not to deny patent protection to the especially gifted inventor
who can recognize and solve a problem with little actual inventive ex-
penditure where others have long-struggled with no success. 2 Second,
we must be careful not to award patent protection to the especially un-
talented inventor who spends excessive inventive resources given the
result achieved or to the rent-seeking inventor who expends excessive
inventive resources in order to obtain a patent. To deal with these cases,
relevant secondary considerations should be used to ensure that the ac-
tual inventive expenditures are neither unreasonably large nor
unreasonably small given the claimed invention at stake.
24. Professor Oddi has suggested considering invention costs directly in patentability
determinations in his proposal for a new category of patents for revolutionary inventions, but
did not recognize the need to consider invention costs as a fraction of the resulting product's
total cost. See A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-
First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 1097, 1127 (1989).
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (Supp. 2000) ("Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made."); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1984) (Reviser's
Note) ("The second sentence states that patentability as to this requirement is not to be nega-
tived by the manner in which the invention was made, that is, it is immaterial whether it
resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius.").
2000-20011
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To set the stage for this discussion, Section I begins with a brief re-
view of the current state of nonobviousness and its diminished role
under the Federal Circuit.
I. THE DEMISE OF THE NONOBVIOUSNESs REQUIREMENT
Since its formal recognition in Hotchkiss and until quite recently,
the nonobviousness26 requirement represented a substantial hurdle to
overcome on the path to a valid patent. Even putting to one side those
times where the Court's effort to turn a phrase yielded a standard near
impossible to satisfy, 27 the requirement that an invention be not merely
new and useful, but a sufficient advance over the prior art to warrant a
patent played a vibrant and central role in separating patentable inven-
tions from unpatentable advances. Yet the advent of the Federal Circuit
and its vesting with exclusive jurisdiction as the intermediate court of
appeals for patent litigation has radically reduced the role of the nonob-
viousness requirement in patent litigation. To explore this, we begin
with an empirical investigation of the appellate treatment of nonobvi-
ousness over the last half-century.
A. From Starring Role to Bit Player: An Empirical
Examination of Obviousness
To examine the changing role of nonobviousness within the patent
system, I conducted an empirical investigation of all appellate decisions
arising from patent infringement litigation" in eight time periods spread
over the last fifty years.29 From this examination, I determined for each
time period: (1) the percentage of utility30 patents3 held invalid in those
26. For the sake of convenience, I will use the term "nonobviousness" to refer to this
third requirement of patentability, rather than switching between "invention" and
"nonobviousness" as the time period dictates.
27. See, e.g., Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941)
("That is to say, the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative
genius, not merely the skill of the calling"); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I,
15 n.7 (1966) (describing "flash of creative genius" language as "but a rhetorical embellish-
ment of language going back to 1833").
28. Appeals from Patent and Trademark Office decisions as to whether to issue a patent
were not considered.
29. The author used the Lexis Federal Court of Appeals database and a search of "core-
terms(patent and infring!)" and an appropriate date restriction to identify initially the rele-
vant cases. To supplement this initial search, an additional search of "core-terms(patent and
obviousness)" with an appropriate date restriction was conducted.
30. Rulings involving design or plant patents were not considered.
31. Where a single patent was at issue and a single resolution was applied to all claims
for that patent at issue, the court's ruling was counted as a single result. Where two or more
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cases where validity was at issue and decided32; and (2) the percentage
of such invalidity rulings based upon obviousness.33
Figure 1 presents the percentage of patents held invalid in those
cases where patent validity was at issue and decided.
FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF PATENTS HELD INVALID WHERE
VALIDITY AT ISSUE AND DECIDED
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As Figure 1 suggests, for the six pre-Federal Circuit time periods
studied, the percentage of patents held invalid cycled somewhat over
time, starting with an initial peak of 63.16 percent in the 1944-1946
time period, declining to a low of 46.43 percent in 1964-1965, then af-
ter Graham, increasing to a second peak of 63.79 percent in 1975-1976,
before falling to another low of 50 percent in 1981-1982, the final pre-
Federal Circuit period After the Federal Circuit assumed jurisdiction
patents, or two or more claims, were at issue, and dealt with by the court as separate issue,
they were counted as separate results. Thus, a single case might involve several patents and
be counted as reaching several results.
32. Validity was not decided on appeal in particular cases for three reasons: (1) a find-
ing as to validity was vacated on appeal and remanded for further factual development in the
trial court; (2) validity was not raised in the trial court and/or on appeal by the parties; or (3)
the appeal dealt solely with an issue of infringement and validity was not decided.
33. Where a single patent or group of claims was held invalid for different reasons, each
basis decided by the appellate court for an invalidity result was counted as a separate result.
34. These figures for invalidity findings track those found in other studies of patent liti-
gation in the pre-Federal Circuit era. See GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A
STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 4-22 to 4-23 (rev. ed. 1980) (finding only about
35 percent of litigated patents held valid for period from 1954 to 1978); Lawrence Baum,
The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
758, 760 (1974) (noting that between 1921 and 1973 the circuit courts found nearly
2000-20011
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of these appeals,35 the invalidity rate fell to 39.34 percent in 1984-198516
and then fell to only 25 percent in 1994-1995.
Figure 1 thus tends to confirm the Federal Circuit's pro-patent
reputation. 7 Moreover, the percentage of the invalid patents held invalid
for obviousness fell even more sharply, as shown in Figure 2.
two-thirds of adjudicated patents invalid); P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents: 1948-54, 38 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 233, 236 (1956) (finding that courts upheld that validity of patents in only
30-40% of the cases in which validity was an issue); Simone A. Rose, Patent
"Monopolyphobia": A Means of Extinguishing the Fountainhead, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
509, 561-62 (1999) (presenting data reflecting validity rate of 21.63 to 53.57 percent from
1944 through 1982).
35. Although the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, two of the cases from the 1984-1985 time period were from other circuits. See Na-
tional Bus. Sys., Inc. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 743 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir. 1984); Fast Heat Element
Mfg. Co. v. Rama Corp., 724 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1984). In these cases, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the trial court's ruling that that patent claims at issue were not proved invalid, see
National Bus. Sys., 743 F.2d at 1232-37, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the patent claims at issue were invalid for fraud on the PTO. See Fast Heat Ele-
ment Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d at 803.
36. This result is consistent with the data presented in other studies. See John R. Allison
& Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J.
185, 205-06 (1998) (finding 54 percent overall validity in cases considered, including both
district and circuit court final decisions from 1989 to 1996); Donald R. Dunner, The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Its First Three Years: Introduction, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 185,
186 (1985) (describing validity percentage of 53.6 percent for section 103 challenges before
the Federal Circuit and of 50 percent for section 102 challenges); Mark A. Lemley, An Em-
pirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 419-20 (1994) (finding
56 percent of all litigated patents held valid during the period 1989-1994); Rose, supra note
34, at 562 (finding annual validity rates ranging from 55.56 to 77.42 percent during the pe-
riod 1983-1993); see also Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:
Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 822 n.71 (1988).
37. On the Federal Circuit's pro-patent reputation, see Merges, supra note 36, at 822.
See also Allison & Lemley, supra note 36, at 206 (noting that validity rate of litigated pat-
ents "is significantly higher than it was before the Federal Circuit was created").
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FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF INVALID PATENTS FOUND
INVALID FOR OBVIOUSNESS
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In Figure 2, the effect of the Federal Circuit on obviousness as a ba-
sis for patent invalidity is sharply evident. In the six pre-Federal Circuit
time periods studied, obviousness was a basis for invalidity in 66.67
percent to 79.49 percent of the cases where a patent was held invalid. It
was by far the most common basis for finding a patent invalid. After
the Federal Circuit assumed jurisdiction of these appeals, obviousness's
importance sharply declined, with obviousness serving as a basis for
invalidity in half of the cases where a patent was held invalid in 1984-
1985, and as a basis for invalidity in only 20 percent of the cases where
a patent was held invalid in 1994-1995."9 Because the data in Figure 2 is
presented as a fraction of the patents held invalid, the data is not simply
a reaffirmation of the Federal Circuit's pro-validity approach. Rather, it
demonstrates that, for a given number of patents held invalid, obvious-
ness was far less likely to serve as the basis for that ruling under the
38. Hence the title of a collection of essays on nonobviousness, NONOBVIOUSNEsS-
THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (J. Witherspoon ed. 1980). Prior statistical
studies have also identified obviousness as the principal basis for an invalidity finding. See
KOENIG, supra note 34, at 5-50; Federico, supra note 34, at 249; see also Robert W. Harris,
Prospects for Supreme Court Review of the Federal Circuit Standards for Obviousness of
Inventions Combining Old Elements, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 66, 66 (1986)
("[O]bviousness is the most frequently dispositive patentability issue, since most inventions
can meet the comparatively liberal requirements of utility and novelty.").
39. See also Allison & Lemley, supra note 36, at 208 (finding obviousness as basis for
invalidity in 42 percent of cases studied from 1989 to 1996, but the study was based on final
Federal Circuit and final district court decisions).
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Federal Circuit than it was during the pre-Federal Circuit era. Thus,
where Figure 1 confirms the Federal Circuit's pro-validity reputation,
Figure 2 demonstrates that, among the available bases for challenging a
patent's validity, obviousness has become particularly disfavored.4
Although we must be careful in drawing inferences from an exami-
nation of appellate case results alone,41 these results strongly suggest
that obviousness is much less central in appellate determinations of pat-
ent validity under the Federal Circuit. That obviousness has fallen into
such disfavor is a fact unlikely to have gone unnoticed by the patent bar
and those involved with patents more generally.42 To the extent that the
Federal Circuit is less likely to find a patent obvious, as this data sug-
gests, the patent's value for purposes of licensing, assignment, and
settlement will be altered. This trend also undoubtedly influences deci-
sions such as whether to apply for, whether to grant, and whether to sue
on a patent in any given case.43 This is not to say that the nonobvious-
ness requirement has passed away altogether. Even under the Federal
Circuit, the nonobvious requirement retains some semblance of life, as
it remains expressly present in section 103 of the Patent Act and has
continued to serve as a basis for finding a patent invalid in some cases.4
40. Of course, if the Federal Circuit desired to decrease the historical rate of invalidity
results, obviousness presented an inviting and necessary target. As Figure 2 demonstrates,
obviousness was the predominant basis for invalidity results in the pre-Federal Circuit era
and therefore was going to have to be cut back to achieve any significant decline in invalid-
ity results. In addition, because obviousness determinations are not bright-line, but a matter
of balancing a number of factors, there was more room for cutting back on obviousness re-
suits, than there was for cutting back on, for example, anticipation results.
41. The difficulties in generalizing from appellate decisions alone have been well-
documented, and include: (1) the potential for skew~ed samples because of the role private
parties play in deciding to sue and appeal particular cases; see Baum, supra note 34, at 768;
and (2) the tendency to appeal issues where the answer is less clear and there is more room
for argument. See also Allison & Lemley, supra note 36, at 202-05 (noting other potential
sources of population bias and inherent limitations on statistical analysis of decisions).
42. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 36, at 822-23 ("These changing perceptions indicate
that at a practical level, respect for patents is probably growing.").
43. For example, one implication of the Federal Circuit's unwillingness to find patents
obvious is an increase in the expected value from any decision to sue. As the risk of an inva-
lidity result decreases, the expected costs from filing suit (which include the risk of an
invalidity finding) also decrease, and as a result, filing suit becomes attractive for increas-
ingly less plausible infringement claims. Thus an increase in findings of no infringement
should be expected as a consequence of a reduced risk of patent invalidity. See also infra
text accompanying notes 89-92.
44. See, e.g., Georgia Pac. Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Richardson-Vicks, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1481-84 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(ruling that patented invention was obvious despite evidence of commercial success and
other secondary considerations); Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Para-ordinance Mfg. v. SGS Importers Int'l, 73 F.3d 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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It appears, however, that nonobviousness's once dominant vitality has
been substantially diminished.
B. Reasons for the Shift
1. The Doctrinal Changes in Obviousness
When we turn from the fact that this shift has occurred to how it has
occurred, we find initially a number of doctrinal changes that the Fed-
eral Circuit has mandated in the obviousness inquiry. Of these changes,
probably the most important has been the Federal Circuit's elevation of
secondary considerations, such as commercial success, long felt but un-
solved needs, and failure of others, to a central, if not dominant, role in
the obviousness inquiry.45 In Graham itself, the Court began with a
three-part factual inquiry for addressing obviousness, directing courts to
determine (i) the scope and content of the prior art; (ii) the differences
between the prior art and the claimed invention; and (iii) the level of
ordinary skill in the art.46 The Court then identified "commercial suc-
cess, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc." as "secondary
considerations" that "might be utilized" and "may have relevancy" to
the obviousness inquiry.47 Until the advent of the Federal Circuit, the
various circuits universally read Graham as focusing the obviousness
inquiry on the three factors of prior art, differences, and ordinary skill,
with the secondary considerations relegated to a subsidiary role. In
keeping with their reading of Graham, the various circuits consistently
held that it was not reversible error for a trial court to fail to consider
evidence of secondary considerations,48 and would allow such evidence
to "tip the scales" in favor of nonobviousness only in close cases where
the three-factor Graham inquiry "[did] not produce a firm conclusion. 49
45. See Merges, supra note 36, at 823-37; Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Cir-
cuit's Patent Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal
Changes, 85 Nw. U. L. Rv. 1051, 1071-72 (1991).
46. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(Supp. 1996).
47. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
48. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Grentec, Inc., 652 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir. 1981) (ruling that a
"failure to consider secondary factors [in determining obviousness] [was] not reversible
error").
49. Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Ass'n, 553 F.2d 740, 748-49 (2d Cir. 1977);
see also Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976) ("Though doubtless a matter
of great convenience, producing a desired result in a cheaper and faster way, and enjoying
commercial success, ... [t]hese desirable benefits 'without invention will not make patent-
ability.' ") (quoting Great A&P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153
(1950)); Medical Lab. Automation, Inc. v. Labcon, Inc., 670 F.2d 671, 675 (7th Cir. 1981).
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In contrast, the Federal Circuit has identified evidence of secon-
dary considerations as often "the most probative and cogent evidence
in the record"50 and has held that it "must always when present be
considered."5" Courts and commentators have long recognized that the
secondary considerations "focus attention on economic and motiva-
tional rather than technical issues and are, therefore, more susceptible of
judicial treatment than are the highly technical facts often present in
patent litigation. 52 Moreover, these considerations provide a seeming
answer to the otherwise difficult question of how to determine, after
undertaking the three-part Graham inquiry, whether any given differ-
ence between the patent claims and the prior art is sufficient to satisfy
the nonobviousness requirement. If the difference leads to commercial
success, addresses a long felt but unsolved need, or solves a problem
that others had attempted to solve but failed, then such facts can, at least
in the Federal Circuit's view, reliably establish that the difference is a
nonobvious advance. 3 As a result, evidence of commercial success or
some other secondary consideration, although not conclusive on the is-
sue of nonobviousness, 4 has become a central, rather than subsidiary,
50. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
51. Id.; see also Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (reversing finding of obviousness for failure to consider evidence of secon-
dary considerations), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock,
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
52. See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of
"Nonobviousness": A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 1169,
1172 (1964); see also Jochen Pagenberg, The Evaluation of the "Inventive Step" in the
European Patent System-More Objective Standards Needed, 9 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 1, 121 (1978) (arguing that the use of circumstantial evidence allows an ob-
jective examination without precluding practical application and is an easier approach for
judges and lawyers to use).
53. See, e.g., Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1997) ("In sum, the record supplies objective evidence of nonobviousness, in-
cluding Baxter's recognition of the importance of this invention, evidence of commercial
success, and evidence of the failure of others to solve the recognized problem. This objective
evidence, combined with the lack of a teaching or suggestion to combine, requires a holding
of nonobviousness.").
54. See Richardson-Vicks, supra note 44, at 1481-84 (ruling that patented invention
was obvious despite evidence of commercial success and other secondary considerations);
Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("In reach-
ing an obviousness determination, a trial court may conclude that a patent claim is obvious,
even in the light of strong objective evidence tending to show non-obviousness."); B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("Considering the minor difference between the claimed invention and the [prior art], the
secondary considerations were not sufficiently compelling" to preclude a conclusion of ob-
viousness.); Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768-69 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989) (noting that secondary considerations "must be considered,
[but] they do not control the obviousness conclusion").
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factor in the obviousness inquiry under the Federal Circuit." In keeping
with this more central role, the Federal Circuit has renamed these con-
siderations as "objective evidence of nonobviousness. '5 The Federal
Circuit has also: (1) employed a broader range of secondary considera-
tions as proof of nonobviousness57; (2) relaxed the required showing that
the commercial success was the result of the nonobvious nature of the
claimed invention, rather than some other factor, such as marketing58;
and (3) restricted attempts to use secondary considerations (or the lack
thereof) to establish that a patent was obvious.59
This increased reliance on secondary considerations tends to re-
duce directly the likelihood that a litigated patent will be found
obvious. As Professor Edmund Kitch warned more than thirty years
ago, an increased reliance on secondary considerations, such as com-
mercial success, to resolve questions of patent validity almost
necessarily leads to a rule "that all patents that are litigated should be
held valid.' '6 As Professor Kitch explained, "it is unlikely that patents
55. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 75 (1988) (reversing district court's finding of obviousness for fail-
ing to give enough weight to evidence of secondary considerations); Alco Standard Corp. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 808 F.2d 1490, 1492, 1499-1501 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. dis-
missed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1988) (holding patent valid on basis of secondary considerations
despite the fact that the prior art analysis suggested that patent was obvious). Indeed, the
Federal Circuit has taken to identifying secondary considerations as a fourth Graham factor.
See, e.g., Robotic Vision Systems, Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Con-Agra, Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1278, 1280 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) ("Obviousness is a question of law with four factual predicates .... ); Modine
Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 541 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal,
Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 872-73 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
56. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 725 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Modine Mfg., 917 F.2d at 541.
57. See Robert W. Harris, The Emerging Primacy of "Secondary Considerations" as
Validity Ammunition: Has the Federal Circuit gone too far?, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 185, 191-92 (1989); Rhodes, supra note 45, at 1071-72.
58. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 36, at 824-25.
59. See Harris, supra note 57, at 193. Compare Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
18 (1966) (noting that secondary considerations "may have relevancy ... as indicia of obvi-
ousness or nonobviousness"), with Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473,
1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that evidence of secondary factors "can only further support
nonobviousness") and Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffery-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955,
960 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that absence of commercial development or other secondary
considerations is not evidence of obviousness, but only "a neutral factor"). Compare Con-
crete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 185 (1925) (relying on near-simultaneous
invention by others to support ruling of obviousness), and Fred Whitaker Co. v. E. T. Bar-
wick Indus., Inc., 551 F.2d 622, 628 (5th Cir. 1977) (same), with Environmental Designs,
Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984) (ruling that evidence of near-simultaneous invention by others not evidence of obvi-
ousness).
60. Edmund Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 Su-
PREME CoURT RaV. 293.
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that are not commercially successful will be brought to litigation."6' As
a result, to the extent that commercial success becomes an important
factor in determining a patent's validity, the very fact that the patent is
worth litigating should establish its validity.62
In addition to elevating the secondary considerations to a primary
role, the Federal Circuit has also rejected application of a stricter obvi-
ousness standard, often known as the synergism requirement, for so-
called "combination" patents, where a claimed invention consists of a
combination of elements already found separately in the prior art.6 Un-
like novelty, where the claimed invention is compared with a single
prior art reference,6 non-obviousness compares the claimed invention
with the relevant prior art as a whole.65 As the Federal Circuit has ex-
plained, obviousness is judged from the perspective of the hypothetical
"'person having ordinary skill in the art' . . who is presumed to be
aware of all the pertinent prior art."' This presumed awareness creates
something of a logical puzzle, however. If our hypothetical person is
aware of all the pertinent prior art and the prior art includes each ele-
ment of the patent claim, then presumably knowledge of a particular
combination of prior art elements is encompassed by knowledge of the
elements as a whole. As a result, where the individual elements of a
claimed invention can all be found in the prior art, the prior art might
also be thought to encompass any given combination of those elements.
Apparently following a similar logical chain, the U.S. Supreme Court
has tended to presume that patents based upon combinations of prior art
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Compare Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976) (ruling that combina-
tion patent was obvious for failing to achieve a "synergistic" result) and Anderson's-Black
Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) (ruling that combination patent
was obvious where combination of old elements did not "result in an effect greater than the
sum of the several effects taken separately"); with Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland
Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (rejecting any "synergism" or "synergistic result"
requirement for patents on combinations of existing or known elements) and Medtronic, Inc.
v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that there is no
statutory basis for identifying "combination" patents and applying a more stringent obvious-
ness test to such patents).
64. See, e.g., Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282
(Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[l]nvalidity by anticipation requires that the four comers of a single, prior
art document describe every element of the claimed invention, either expressly or inherently,
such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention without undue
experimentation.").
65. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 34-37 (1966) (combining elements
from prior art patents to conclude that claimed invention was obvious).
66. Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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elements are obvious.67 Only where some intervening consideration,
such as unusual or surprising consequences from the combination, broke
the logical chain would the Court rule a combination patent nonobvi-
ous. 6
But the Federal Circuit has refused to follow the Supreme Court's
lead on this issue.69 Instead, the Federal Circuit has pretended that the
reasoning of the Court is nonsensical 70 and on that basis, has substituted
its own approach for the Court's in these cases. Specifically, the Federal
Circuit permits an obviousness determination to be based upon com-
bining elements from different prior art references only if the prior art
contains some suggestion or reason to combine the elements in the
manner set forth in the claim (the "suggestion test"). 7' Although the
Federal Circuit has permitted "implicit" suggestions to satisfy the test,
7 2
the Federal Circuit's test essentially reverses the key presumption in
these cases. Where all of the elements were known, the Supreme Court
presumed that any given combination was obvious, unless there was
67. See, e.g., Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282; Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc., 396 U.S. at 61;
Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
68. See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (ruling that patent was nonob-
vious where combination of prior art elements "'wholly unexpectedly' has shown 'certain
valuable operating advantages over other batteries' while those from which it is claimed to
have been copied were long ago discarded").
69. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 904
(1991); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1989).
70. See Medtronics, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (refusing to follow Court's approach to combination patents "because virtually every
claimed invention is a combination of old elements"); see also Environmental Designs v.
Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984)
("Virtually all inventions are combinations and virtually all are combinations of old ele-
ments.").
71. See Robotic Vision Systems, Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("The party seeking a holding of invalidity based on a combination of two or
more prior art teachings must show some motivation or suggestion to combine the teach-
ings."); Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., Inc., 103 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("A determination of obviousness must involve more than indiscriminately combining
prior art; a motivation or suggestion to combine must exist.") (citation omitted); In re Lask-
owski, 871 F.2d 115, 117 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reversing PTO rejection of patent application for
band saw wheel because although prior art contained each element set forth in the patent
claims, the prior art did not contain any suggestion to combine the elements in the manner
set forth in the claims); see also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Nies,
C.J., concurring) ("While there must be some teaching, reason, suggestion, or motivation to
combine existing elements to produce the claimed device, it is not necessary that the cited
references or prior art specifically suggest making the combination.").
72. See, e.g., Rivervood Int'l Corp. v. Mead Corp., 212 F.3d 1365, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("In addition, when obviousness is based on particular prior art references, there must
be a showing of a suggestion or motivation to combine the teachings of those references,
though it need not be expressly stated.").
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some reason that suggested otherwise. The Federal Circuit, on the other
hand, presumes that any given combination is nonobvious, unless there
is some suggestion in the prior art otherwise.
2. The Federal Circuit's Perspective on
Patents and Obviousness
As important as these (and other) doctrinal changes have been in re-
shaping the role of obviousness in patent litigation, equally important
has been the Federal Circuit itself and the intellectual perspective it
brings to patent litigation. Created, at least in part, in response to per-
ceived attacks on the patent system from a federal judiciary often
openly hostile to patents and the patent system,73 the Federal Circuit has
taken its role as defender of the patent system seriously. 4 In pursuit of
that perceived role, the Federal Circuit has at times shown a reckless
indifference to its sworn duty to "uphold the law," which presumably
includes following the binding precedent of the Court even where (or
perhaps, especially where) certain members of the Federal Circuit be-
lieve the Court is wrong.7
As part of this perceived role, the Federal Circuit has rejected the
traditional judicial view that patents are monopolies, presumptively un-
desirable and, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, an "embarrassment.,
76
73. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1966) (remarking on the
"notorious difference applied by the Patent Office and by the courts" to the obviousness
issue); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156-58 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("The fact that a patent as flimsy and spurious as this one had to be
brought all the way to this Court to be declared invalid dramatically illustrates how far our
patent system frequently departs from the Constitutional standards which are supposed to
govern.").
74. See Dreyfuss, supra note 69, at 26-30 (noting that "anecdotal evidence suggests
that the CAFC is a good court for patentees," while pointing to other doctrinal developments
that serve the broader public interest).
75. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 38, at 77 ("The CCPA and CAFC decisions employing
the suggestion test do not offer an adequate, well-reasoned analysis justifying the suggestion
test in light of modem Supreme Court case law. Instead, the CCPA and the CAFC simply
continued to employ the suggestion test, stated by the CCPA in 1938, while largely ignoring
the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny standard."). I can certainly understand the difficulty pre-
sented in having to not only follow, but actively enforce, a decision with which one whole-
heartedly disagrees, but for a judge who finds herself unwilling or unable to enforce the
binding precedent of the Court, there is a simple solution: resign.
76. The Court has described patents as monopolies on a number of occasions. For ex-
ample, in Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., the
Court wrote:
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. As recognized by the
Constitution, it is a special privilege designed to serve the public purpose of pro-
moting the "Progress of Science and useful Arts." At the same time, a patent is an
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free
and open market. The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent,
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As Judge Clevenger explained in his dissent from denial of a rehearing
en bane in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States:" "We have come a
long way from the days when judges frowned on patents as pernicious
monopolies deserving scant regard."7 Although precisely who Judge
Clevenger means by "[w]e" is unclear, the Federal Circuit has made a
point of chastising parties for referring to a patent as a "monopoly,"79
has disapproved the characterization of a patentee as a "monopolist,"8 °
and has cautioned trial courts that jury instructions that identify a patent
as a "monopoly" from which the public must be "protected" "are likely
to be prejudicial and should be avoided."'" In the view of the Federal
Circuit, patents are simply a form of property, not monopoly. As then-
Chief Judge Markey explained in 1983: A patent, under the statute, is
property. 35 U.S.C. § 261. Nowhere in any statute is a patent described
as a monopoly. The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the
very definition of "property."' 2
Not only has this "simply-property" perspective colored the Federal
Circuit's doctrinal development of the obviousness doctrine and its ap-
plication to particular cases, but it has also undermined the obviousness
doctrine in two more important respects. First, it has led the Federal
Circuit to avoid the issue of patent validity altogether when the litiga-
tion can be resolved on other grounds, such as non-infringement. This
avoidance of the validity issue represents a sharp break with pre-Federal
therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies
spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that
such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.
324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945); see also Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Founda-
tion, 402 U.S. 313, 342-43 (1971) ("Although recognizing the patent system's desirable
stimulus to invention, we have also viewed the patent as a monopoly which, although sanc-
tioned by law, has the economic consequences attending other monopolies."); United States
v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241
(1942); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
77. 148 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
78. Id. at 1385.
79. See Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("It is but an obfuscation to refer to a patent as 'the patent monopoly' or to describe a patent
as an 'exception to the general rule against monopolies."'); see also In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d
1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that the PTO Solicitor "properly deplores [another
party's] use of the ambiguous word 'monopoly,' preferring to use the more accurate and less
emotion-generating expression 'extension of patent rights'"). The Federal Circuit has
avoided acknowledging that it has often been the Court itself that has defined patents as
monopolies and as "an exception to the general rules against monopolies." See supra cases
cited in note 76.
80. See Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Industrial Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) ("Further, this court has disapproved of a challenger's characterization of a pat-
entee by the term 'monopolist,' which is commonly regarded as pejorative.").
81. Id.
82. Carl Schenck, A.G., 713 F.2d at 786 n.3.
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Circuit practice. In Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp.,3 the
Court specifically emphasized the need to address the question of valid-
ity in patent litigation:
There has been a tendency among the lower federal courts in in-
fringement suits to dispose of them where possible on the
ground of non-infringement without going into the question of
validity of the patent. It has come to be recognized, however,
that of the two questions, validity has the greater public impor-
tance, and the District Court in this case followed what will
usually be the better practice by inquiring fully into the validity
of this patent.m
Although courts did not take this statement as an invariable com-
mand, 5 the routine practice before the advent of the Federal Circuit was
to adjudicate a patent's validity even where infringement was not
found.86 This practice is clearly reflected in the empirical data I col-
lected. Of the cases from the six pre-Federal Circuit time periods, fewer
than 10 percent were resolved by a finding of non-infringement alone.
83. 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
84. Id. at 330; see also Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100
(1993) (reversing Federal Circuit's practice of vacating findings of invalidity where non-
infringement found in light of "strong public interest" in "resolving questions of patent va-
lidity"); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971)
(reversing doctrine of licensee estoppel and allowing a licensee to contest the validity of a
patent in the light of the strong public interest in questions of patent validity); Slawson v.
Grand St., P.P. & F.R.R. Co., 107 U.S. 649, 652 (Oct. 1882 term) ("Every suitor in such a
cause should, therefore, understand that the question whether the invention, which is the
subject matter in controversy, is patentable or not is always open to the consideration of the
court, whether the point is raised by the answer or not."); Hieger v. Ford Motor Co., 516
F.2d 1324, 1327 (6th Cir. 1975) ("It is now well recognized that an invalid patent is a blight
on 'the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas
which are in reality a part of the public domain,' and should be expunged whenever the issue
can be reached.") (citation omitted). But see Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943)
("To hold a patent valid if it is not infringed is to decide a hypothetical case.").
85. See Harris v. Air King Prods., Inc., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.)
("The passage [quoted above from Sinclair] was not put in the form of a peremptory direc-
tion, but rather of a cautionary admonition to be followed when that is the more convenient
course."); Helbush v. Finlde, 170 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1948); see also Marvin Glass & As-
socs. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 448 F.2d 60, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1971) (affirming trial court on
non-infringement alone given narrowing of patent that precluded patent holder from using
the patent "to exact tribute from competitors or to foreclose the talking book field"); Borden
Co. v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 369 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1966).
86. See, e.g., Hieger, 516 F.2d at 1327; Harrington Mfg. Co. v. White, 475 F.2d 788,
793 (5th Cir. 1973); M.O.S. Corp. v. John I. Haas Co., 375 F.2d 614, 617, 620-21 (9th Cir.
1967) (ruling patent invalid on appeal where trial court had found non-infringement); May-
tag Co. v. Murray Corp., 318 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1963); Apex Electrical Mfg. Co. v.
Altorfer Bros. Co., 238 F.2d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 1956); Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v.
American Bowling & Billiard Corp., 150 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1945) (ruling on issue of va-
lidity and finding patent invalid where trial court had ruled on non-infringement alone).
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If patents are simply property and not monopoly,' however, then
there is only the private, and no "greater public," interest at stake in any
given patent's validity. As a result, there is no need to reach out and
address a patent's validity when that issue is unnecessary to decide a
case. Perhaps for that reason, the Federal Circuit has preferred
a "validity-only-if-necessary" approach. Rather than implement its
preferred approach by challenging Sinclair directly, the Federal Cir-
cuit has taken advantage of the fact that Sinclair, although indicating
the "better practice," left open the possibility that resolving a case on
non-infringement alone might sometimes be appropriate. The Federal
Circuit has taken this leeway and used it to approve a general practice of
resolving cases on non-infringement alone, at least "[w]here... non-
infringement is clear and invalidity is not plainly evident."88 Although
this statement sets forth a standard not markedly different from the
standard sometimes recited in the pre-Federal Circuit era,89 the practice
under the Federal Circuit has been quite different. In contrast to the pre-
Federal Circuit era where fewer than 10 percent of the cases were re-
solved on non-infringement alone, in the 1994-1995 time period, the
Federal Circuit resolved 43.82 percent of the patent infringement cases
before it on non-infringement alone without addressing validity. °
87. Proponents of the simply-property perspective apparently assume that property and
monopoly are opposites so that patents are either property or monopoly, but are not both. But
"monopoly" and "property" are not opposites, nor are they mutually exclusive. The opposite
of property is not monopoly, but a commons. The opposite of monopoly is not property, but
competition. Monopoly and property address different issues. Property refers to a set of legal
relationships between one individual, others, and a thing (intangible or otherwise); monopoly
refers to the character of the market in which the thing is traded. Thus, a patent can both be
property and create monopoly. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incen-
tives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. Rav. 483, 518 n. 143 (1996) [hereinafter Lunney,
Reexamining Copyright] ("The fact that [copyrights, patents, trademarks, and other forms of
'intellectual property'] are property, however, tells us nothing, or at least nothing interesting,
about the degree of competition presents in the market in which such property is traded....
Property is not the opposite of monopoly, but the foundation of it .... ) (citations omitted).
88. See Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp., 739 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("While
the better practice is to treat both the validity and infringement issues, particularly in view of
the public interest in the validity issue, it is not always necessary to do so. Where, as here,
non-infringement is clear and invalidity is not plainly evident, it is appropriate to treat only
the infringement issue.") (citations omitted).
89. See, e.g., Helbush, 170 F.2d at 42 ("We do not hold that the question of validity
must be determined in every patent infringement case in which it is raised. There may be
cases in which non-infringement is so apparent as to make it unnecessary to determine the
question of validity.").
90. The Federal Circuit has further insulated patents from validity challenges by two
additional rules. First, once the claim of patent infringement has been resolved adversely to
the patent holder, there is no longer a case or controversy sufficient to enable the alleged
infringer to maintain a declaratory judgment action of invalidity. See Augustine Med., Inc. v.
Gaymar Indus., 181 F.3d 1291, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that "dismissal of [patent in-
fringement] claims with prejudice eliminated any potential case or controversy and thereby
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In theory, the Federal Circuit's preference for resolving cases on
non-infringement alone does not necessarily undercut the nonobvious-
ness requirement. One could argue that it merely delays resolution of
the nonobviousness issue to those cases where infringement is found.
Yet, as a practical matter, here, as elsewhere, delayed justice often
means no justice at all. By postponing the validity issue to a later case,
the Federal Circuit has undercut the nonobviousness requirement in two
respects. First, the increased emphasis on non-infringement is likely to
affect litigation strategies as alleged infringers shift more of their re-
sources towards proving non-infringement and less towards proving
invalidity in response to the increased likelihood that validity will not be
addressed and any resources spent thereon wasted. The preference for
resolving cases on non-infringement alone will therefore likely lead to
some marginal reduction in the effort directed at establishing a patent's
obviousness. Second, where a patent has substantial value, the risk of a
declaration of invalidity represents a substantial potential loss that may
result from filing a patent infringement suit. For such patents, the Fed-
eral Circuit's increased willingness to resolve cases on non-
infringement alone reduces the risk to a patent holder of losing her
patent and thereby also reduces the risk of filing an infringement ac-
tion. For that reason, a "validity-only-if-necessary" approach improves
the settlement position of the patent holder, before and during litigation,
and encourages the filing of suit based upon less plausible infringement
claims. Moreover, as the pre-Federal Circuit courts recognized, failing
to resolve the validity issue where raised permits potentially invalid
claims to "remain in terrorem of the art"9 and to serve as a basis for
enabling the patent holder to extract license fees, if not monopoly rents.
Even if the nonobviousness requirement remained in full force and ef-
fect where necessary to decide a case, avoiding the invalidity issue
where possible increases individuals' ability to cloak themselves with
the protection of a patent, without adversary testing of their patent's
obviousness.
mooted Gaymar's claim of invalidity"). Second, if the district court enters a ruling of non-
infringement on a summary judgment motion, while at the same time denying summary
judgment motions of invalidity, only the summary judgment of non-infringement may be
immediately appealed. If the summary judgment of non-infringement is affirmed, then the
case is over as above. If the summary judgment of non-infringement is reversed or vacated,
then the denial of the summary judgment motion as to invalidity is a non-final order and is
not appealable until after trial. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d
1298, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (refusing to review denial of summary judgment motions for
invalidity where court vacated summary judgment of non-infringement).
91. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, 168 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. de-
nied, 335 U.S. 825 (1948).
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Second, and more fundamentally, the Federal Circuit's adoption of
the view that patents are simply property has eviscerated the traditional
justification for the nonobviousness requirement. Under the traditional
legal and economic view of patents,92 patents represent a trade-off
between expected benefits in the form of increased incentives to invent,
to innovate,93 and to disclose publicly new discoveries as they are made,
and expected costs primarily arising from the patent-holder's right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention.Y
Under the traditional view, both the benefits and the costs arise based on
the assumption that a patent can, where the invention is valuable and
alternatives are unavailable or difficult to develop, enable the patent
holder to charge consumers somewhat more for the patented invention
than she could charge in the absence of a patent.95 On one side, this
"market power" and the associated increase in market price provide a
source of economic rents that represents the increased incentive to in-
vent, innovate, and disclose. Yet, on the other, this market power
represents the primary cost of a patent, as the higher prices will force
some consumers to do without, creating the same type of deadweight
losses associated with monopolies generally.
As a result, the decision whether to grant any given patent requires a
careful balancing of expected benefits and expected costs. Where the
expected benefits exceed expected costs, the patent should issue or be
enforced, but not otherwise. Ideally, under this view, a patent should be
given for an invention only if the invention would not have been
92. For the sake of completeness, I would mention that I am aware of Professor Kitch's
"prospect" theory of patents, see Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977), and Professors Grady and Alexander's rent dissipation
theory of patents. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation,
78 VA. L. REv. 305 (1992). As I find neither theory normatively persuasive or descriptively
useful, I will not refer to them further in this essay.
93. Following the conventions of Merges and others, I will use "invent" to refer to the
initial discovery and "innovation" to the commercialization of new technology. See Merges,
supra note 36, at 807.
94. The Court has essentially adopted this traditional view throughout its jurisprudence
and is well-represented in cases such as Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141 (1989). For general presentations of the traditional economic view, see STUDY OF
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., AN ECONOMIC REvIEw OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, Study
No. 15, 1-7 (Comm. Print 1958) [hereinafter MACHLUP, ECONOMIC REVIEW]; F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 442, 450 (2d ed. 1980);
GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 123-25 (1968); W. BOWMAN, JR., PAT-
ENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 15-32 (1973); Baxter, supra note 23.
95. See, e.g., Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345 (7th Cir. 1983) (en
bane) (Posner, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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developed but for the patent.96 If the claimed invention would have been
developed, commercialized, and disclosed even without a patent, then
granting or enforcing a patent would make little sense. The public
would receive little additional benefit, yet would have to endure the
costs associated with any market power the patent creates. On the other
hand, if the claimed invention would not have been developed, com-
mercialized, or disclosed in the absence of an expectation of a patent,
then granting and enforcing a patent would make considerably more
sense. The public would have to pay somewhat more for the patented
invention, but that would be preferable to the alternative of not having
the invention at all. From this traditional perspective, "[t]he inherent
problem was to develop some means of weeding out those inventions
which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a
patent."97
In Bonito Boats, Inc., Justice O'Connor called the federal patent sys-
tem "a carefully crafted bargain" where society seeks to "encourag[e] the
creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in tech-
nology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the
invention for a period of years."98 When we turn to the three prerequi-
sites for a patent from this bargain perspective, novelty and utility play
important initial roles in the bargaining process, by ensuring that society
is making the bargain with the right person (i.e. the first to invent) and
is receiving something of value.99 Once these initials preconditions to
the bargain are resolved, however, obviousness determines whether the
bargain is desirable; it serves as the "means of weeding out" undeserv-
ing inventions. Indeed, under the traditional view, obviousness is
defined by this purpose.' If the claimed invention contains sufficient
technical advance that it would not likely have occurred but for the ex-
pectation of a patent, then the invention is nonobvious."'0 If the claimed
invention contains so little technical advance that it would likely have
96. See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 11; Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and
Patent-Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 977, 985-87 (1977);
Kitch, supra note 60, at 301.
97. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11.
98. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 150-51.
99. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 36, at 811-12.
100. Although a patent is awarded only after the initial invention has occurred through
reduction-to-practice, the decision to pursue the invention is initially and necessarily made
before the patent is received. As a result, it is the expectation of receiving a patent (or of a
chance to receive a patent) that actually drives the initial decision.
101. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 36, at 810 ("Does the system require a level of in-
vention that ensures that all patents will disclose a significant technical advance? I conclude
that it does, if the law-most notably the requirement of nonobviousness-is applied cor-
rectly.").
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occurred without the expectation of a patent, then the invention is obvi-
ous. Under the traditional view, then, nonobviousness plays the central
role in deciding whether the patent bargain makes sense for any given
invention, as the empirical data in Figure 2 for the pre-Federal Circuit
periods reflects.
In addition to giving nonobviousness a central role within the patent
system, the traditional view also accords nonobviousness a sensible and
articulable purpose that courts, commentators, and attorneys can use as
a touchstone to guide their analyses. Although this shared view of its
purpose did not ensure complete consistency in application of the non-
obviousness standard, even among the courts,"° having a purpose
behind the requirement ensured that nonobviousness was not simply a
formality, not simply words in the statute devoid of any underlying sub-
stance. The purpose also provided a basis for rational discussion of the
issue. If a court was imposing too high or too low a standard, an attor-
ney or commentator could attempt to demonstrate that the court was
overestimating or underestimating the costs of and/or benefits from the
patent bargain and should adjust its standard of obviousness accord-
ingly. Although the court might not accept the argument, there was at
least a rational basis for engaging the court on the issue.
In contrast, if one accepts the view that patents are simply prop-
erty, then the right to exclude others associated with patents is no
different from the right to exclude associated with, for example, land.0 3
Under this view of patents, the traditional perspective's balancing of
costs and benefits breaks down. From a simply-property perspective, the
benefits of patents, in the form of increased incentives to invent, to in-
novate, and to disclose, apparently remain. 4 But the simply-property
perspective rejects the notion that patents are monopolies and regards
them simply as property rights. While they "like other property rights,
may be used in a scheme violative of antitrust laws,"'0' 5 "patent rights
102. While the pre-Federal Circuit courts generally accepted the traditional view of the
categories of costs and benefits created by patents, as it turned out, they had quite divergent
views of the precise extent of those costs and benefits as an empirical matter. As a result,
some courts required somewhat more of an advance, while others required somewhat less,
before they perceived the bargain as sensible. See Baum, supra note 34, at 762 (noting wide
variation between the circuits in percentage of patents upheld as valid).
103. See Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
104. This appearance may prove misleading. From the traditional view, a patent can
generate no additional economic incentives absent market power and its associated dead-
weight losses. As a result, if the assumption that a patent is simply property and hence
generates no market power is, in fact, true, then the patent will also not generate any eco-
nomic incentives to invent, innovate, or disclose. As we shall see, proponents of the simply-
property perspective would simply re-characterize these rents as proper scarcity rents. See
infra text accompanying notes 128-135.
105. Carl Schenck, A.G., 713 F.2d at 786 n.3 (emphasis in original).
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are not legal monopolies in the antitrust sense of the word."1" Because
the costs of the patent system under the traditional view are a function
of the presumed monopoly character of a patent, these costs are
fundamentally inconsistent with a simply-property view of patents. As
a result, these costs are not considered (and do not really exist) under a
simply-property framework. Once these monopoly costs are eliminated
from the cost-benefit balance, the costs of the patent system and of any
given patent are vastly reduced. Without the deadweight losses from a
presumed monopoly, the costs associated with the patent system would
include only the transaction costs involved in establishing and adminis-
tering the system or, in a particular case, the marginal administrative
expense associated with the patent at issue. Under such a perspective,
the cost-benefit balance shifts sharply in favor of granting patents.
Moreover, once the monopoly costs are removed from the equa-
tion, the preoccupation with a means for identifying those inventions
worth the "embarrassment of an exclusive patent," found under the
traditional view, disappears, taking with it the central justification for
the nonobviousness requirement. If patents are not monopolies and do
not generate monopoly-like deadweight losses, they are not an
"embarrassment"10 7 and there seems no longer any reason to restrict
them to cases where the invention would not have occurred but for the
expectation of a patent.0 8 As a result, the need for some means to
"weed out" undeserving inventions seems largely to disappear, leaving
an individual who creates something new and useful presumptively en-
titled to a property right reflecting her contribution. Viewed in this way,
the simply-property perspective cuts nonobviousness from its tradi-
tional mooring and leaves it adrift; the words in the statute remain, but
they lack any clear direction.
106. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
107. Thomas Jefferson's language referring to the "embarrassment of an exclusive pat-
ent" has been cited only twice in Federal Circuit opinions, and in both instances, by a
dissenting judge. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Nies, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1553 n.26 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. One might argue that if patents are granted on every trifling advance, then to in-
troduce any modem product might require licenses from any number of patent-holders, each
with a claim to some small piece of the product, and the resulting transaction costs might
prove, on balance, more harmful than any benefit derived from the grant of the patents. Be-
cause I plan to require some significant advance before a patent may be granted and because
of space limitations, I will not explore this argument further. But I wanted to note its avail-
ability as a back-up to the argumernt I present in the text.
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3. The Simply-Property Perspective as Descriptive Tool
Putting to one side its normative merits, I believe that thinking of
patents as simply property has considerable power as a positive or de-
scriptive tool to explain the changes the Federal Circuit has made in
obviousness practice.'O Certainly, the far less central role to which the
simply-property perspective relegates obviousness is consistent with the
particular disfavor in which obviousness has fallen under the Federal
Circuit.
In addition, the simply-property perspective predicts the Federal
Circuit's doctrinal changes in the obviousness inquiry far better than the
traditional perspective. As Professor Kitch and Professor Merges have
pointed out, the Federal Circuit's elevation of secondary considerations
to a fourth Graham factor and the Federal Circuit's particular emphasis
on commercial success cannot easily be reconciled with the traditional
perspective's understanding of the nonobviousness requirement."0 Ei-
ther because of the long inferential chain between commercial success
and true technical advance, as Professor Kitch has explained, or because
of imperfect information, variety in innovation strategies, and the cen-
tral role of marketing, in Professor Merge's view, commercial success
provides little support for the proposition that a claimed invention rep-
resents the sort of technical advance that would "warrant the
embarrassment of a patent."''. This elevation is therefore inconsistent
with the traditional perspective's cost-benefit balance and the resulting
role the traditional perspective assigns the nonobviousness requirement.
Yet, even if commercial success does not establish that the level of
technical advance present is sufficient to warrant a patent under the tra-
ditional view, it does tend to prove that at least some advance has
occurred."' Social value and innovation rent thus move together as a
general matter. As a result, an emphasis on commercial success better
fits obviousness's more limited role under the simply-property perspec-
tive. Commercial success alone tends to establish that the patent-holder
has given us something both new and useful, and is therefore
109. I also believe that the simply-property perspective better predicts the Federal Cir-
cuit's narrowing of infringement standards, but a full discussion of that issue is beyond the
scope of this essay.
110. See Kitch, supra note 60, at 332; Merges, supra note 36, at 839, 842-52.
111. See Kitch, supra note 60, at 332; Merges, supra note 36, at 839, 842-52.
112. Even here, the inferential chain is not perfect. New packaging, better quality con-
trol, better trained employees and a host of other factors may lead to the commercial success
of a "new" entrant, even without any technical advance in the product offered or the method
of producing it. See, e.g., R.G. Cooper & E.J. Kleinschmidt, New Products: What Separates
Winners from Losers?, 4 J. PROD. INNOV. MGMT. 169, 182 (1987).
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presumptively entitled under the simply-property perspective to a prop-
erty right reflecting her contribution.
Similarly, in dealing with combination patents, if we are looking for
a test that better determines whether a new combination of prior art
elements entails some significant level of technical advance, the
synergism test appears better suited to that role than the suggestion
test.'1 3 By requiring some unusual or unexpected result, the synergism
test better identifies those combinations of prior art elements that would
not likely have been discovered but for the inducement of a patent."4 On
the other hand, if we are looking for a test that ensures only that the
claimed combination of prior art elements was not already present in the
prior art, the suggestion test appears better suited to that role than the
synergism test. That the prior art did not suggest combining the ele-
ments may not establish that developing the combination was an
arduous or tricky task, but it does tend to prove that the combination
was, in fact, new. Again, this seems to fit with the simply-property view
that so long as the individual has contributed something new (and oth-
erwise useful), she is presumptively entitled to a property right
reflecting her contribution.
Aside from more accurately predicting the doctrinal changes the
Federal Circuit has adopted, the advent of the simply-property perspec-
tive may also help us understand why the nonobviousness issue
continues to prove troublesome for the court. This continuing difficulty
in applying the nonobviousness doctrine to particular cases is somewhat
surprising. Given the general disfavor in which obviousness has fallen,
as well as the vesting of intermediate appellate jurisdiction with a single
court, I expected to find more uniformity in the Federal Circuit deci-
sions than was present in the pre-Federal Circuit era."5 Yet, beyond
113. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 45, at 1080-82.
114. Compare Dreyfuss, supra note 69, at 15-16 (arguing that "suggestion" test better
reflects the "imperatives of invention").
115. The legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act indicates that in-
creased uniformity and reduced uncertainty was a principal justification for the creation of
the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 69, at 7-14 (noting concern for precision);
Lever, The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Part I), 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 178,
186-200 (1982); Merges, supra note 36, at 821. As one witness testified during the hearings
leading to the creation of the Federal Circuit:
Patents, in my judgment, are a stimulus to the innovative process, which includes
not only investment in research and development but also a far greater investment
in facilities for producing and distributing goods. Certainly, it is important to those
who must make these investment decisions that we decrease unnecessary uncer-
tainties in the patent system.
The Federal Court Improvements Act of 1981, S. Rep. 275, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1981)
(statement of Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., General Patent Counsel for General Electric Corp.).
E-Obviousness
obviousness's general disfavor and a common doctrinal approach, con-
sistency in the resolution of obviousness cases continues to elude the
Federal Circuit. Although the Federal Circuit has elevated the secondary
considerations to a central role in the obviousness inquiry, sometimes a
strong showing of secondary considerations will be sufficient to over-
come a conclusion of obviousness based upon the three Graham
factors;1 6 sometimes it will not."' Similarly, in dealing with so-called
combination patents, the Federal Circuit will, at times, enforce the sug-
gestion requirement strictly."" Yet in other cases, the suggestion
requirement proves far less strict."9 As a result, the border between
116. See, e.g., ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reversing
jury's conclusion of obviousness based on court's perception of unsolved need and commer-
cial success); Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 957-58 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (reversing by 2-1 vote trial court's ruling of obviousness based upon court's percep-
tion of commercial success and skepticism); Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
110 F.3d 1573, 1570-80 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing trial court's ruling of obviousness based
on court's perception of commercial success, alleged infringer's touting the advance, and
long-felt but unsolved need).
117. See Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Mead Corp., 212 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(reversing trial court's ruling that patent was nonobvious on grounds that "the objective
factors did not carry sufficient weight to override a conclusion of obviousness"); Richard-
son-Vicks, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1481-83 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming ruling
that patent claims were obvious despite commercial success and presence of other objective
factors); see also Merges, supra note 36, at 825, 831 (comparing Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v.
AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986), with Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776
F.2d 309 (Fed. Cir. 1985) to illustrate similar inconsistency).
118. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Gypsum Corp., 195 F.3d 1322,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming judgment of nonobviousness where there was no express
suggestion in the prior art references); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 189
F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that absence of teaching in the prior art forecloses
obviousness); Smith Indus. Medical Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1356-57
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (reversing trial court's conclusion of obviousness based on absence of
teaching or suggestion to combine elements); ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 546
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (reversing jury's conclusion of obviousness based on absence of teaching or
suggestion to combine elements); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (same); The Beachcombers v. Wildewood Creative Prods., 31 F.3d 1154,
1160-63 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reversing judgment of obviousness based upon jury findings
where Federal Circuit found no evidence that the prior art "discloses or suggests" the combi-
nation of elements claimed).
119. See, e.g., Riverwood Int'l Corp., 212 F.3d at 1366-67 (reversing district court and
holding patent obvious where elements were present in prior art and possibility of substitu-
tion was within knowledge of person with ordinary skill in the art despite absence of express
teaching to substitute); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming
obviousness rejection where, despite absence of express teaching or suggestion, there was a
"trend in the art" towards the patent claims at issue); Valmet Paper Mach., Inc. v. Beloit
Corp., 105 F.3d 1409, 1413-14 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing district court's ruling of nonob-
viousness and ruling patent obvious despite absence of express teaching to combine
elements); Para-Ordinance Mfg. v. SGS Importers Int'l, 73 F.3d 1085, 1090-91 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (affirming by a 2-1 vote judgment of obviousness based upon jury verdict despite
absence of specific suggestion to combine prior art elements, despite improper introduction
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obvious advances and nonobvious inventions remains more a large gray
area than a bright-line. Although some cases are easy to predict under
the Federal Circuit, just as other cases were easy to predict in the pre-
Federal Circuit era, predicting the resolution of the obviousness issue
for most cases remains a task as fraught with difficulty today as it was
before the Federal Circuit.20
I believe this continuing uncertainty over proper application of the
nonobviousness requirement to particular cases stems from the fact that
the simply-property perspective appears to eliminate the nonobvious-
ness doctrine's central justification, as traditionally understood. While
we can reshape the nonobviousness doctrine to fit the simply-property
perspective by re-creating it as a check to ensure that a patent is not re-
moving knowledge or materials already in the public domain, the
novelty requirement already addresses this issue. In addition, the statu-
tory language in section 103 seems to emphasize something more than
novelty. Section 103 expressly bars patents for inventions even where
they are "not identically disclosed" in the prior art. 121 The statutory lan-
guage thus seems expressly to contemplate that nonobviousness requires
something more than mere novelty. The invention must not only be dif-
ferent from the prior art (i.e. new), but the difference must be such that
"the subject matter as a whole" was not "obvious at the time the inven-
tion was made."' 22
Yet, under the simply-property perspective, there seems to be no
policy justification for imposing such a requirement beyond novelty. As
a result, for those on the Federal Circuit who have fully accepted the
simply-property perspective, section 103 sets forth words on a page, but
they are words that lack any sensible purpose or direction. Given the
lack of any underlying purpose for the requirement, these judges must
determine what the words mean as words alone-an approach difficult
at any time for those trained in the realist tradition, but made particu-
larly so here by the central use of the unhelpful word "obvious."
Without a purpose for the statutory requirement and without language in
the statute that is capable of defining itself, each judge must necessarily
decide for herself the level of technical advance required to satisfy the
statute.1 3 The net result has been uncertainty and confusion. Some
judges have retreated to a view of nonobviousness as a "novelty-plus"
of hindsight-based defense exhibit, and despite evidence of commercial success, failure of
others, exact copying, and teaching away from the combination in the prior art).
120. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 38, at 76.
121. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. 2000).
122. Id.
123. See Harris, supra note 38, at 76 (critiquing the suggestion test as being subjective
and thereby "introduc[ing] a major element of unpredictability as to patent validity").
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requirement that checks the invention for novelty against the prior art as
a whole, rather than against prior art references individually; others
seem determined to require some level of technical advance, but are
unable to articulate a justification for defining any given level as the
right level. Beyond these immediate difficulties, the absence of any un-
derlying policy justification for the requirement precludes a rational
basis (aside from the word "obvious" itself and the surrounding statu-
tory language) even to argue for, let alone decide, what level of advance
should suffice to render an invention nonobvious.
All of this is compounded by the long shadow of the traditional per-
spective. Years of jurisprudence based upon the traditional perspective
are unlikely to disappear without a trace, particularly where the Court
has so far refused to repudiate its own longstanding jurisprudence re-
flecting that perspective. Even some members of the Federal Circuit
may retain some continuing commitment to the traditional perspective.
Yet, these two perspectives appear fundamentally incompatible. Where
one sees monopoly, the other sees property. This dichotomy makes
dialogue between proponents of these two views difficult, at the very
least. Judge Posner, for example, when confronted with the view that
patents are simply property and not monopoly responded:
A patent enables its owner to monopolize the production of
things in which the patented idea is embodied. To deny that pat-
ent protection has this effect, the position that a footnote in the
majority opinion attributes to the chief judge of the new patent
appeals court, is-with all due respect-to bury one's head in
the sand.'2
Although no doubt heartfelt, Judge Posner's words are unlikely to
persuade adherents of the simply-property perspective to abandon their
views nor do they help establish a basis for further discussion. Yet, un-
less the Federal Circuit can be persuaded to abandon the simply-
property perspective and return to the traditional perspective's fold,
moving forward on the obviousness issue requires identifying some
common ground between these two perspectives. If we find none, then it
is simply a question of which perspective will prevail and we can resort
to Judge Posner's approach. However, I believe that the two perspec-
tives share more than initially appears and that a workable
124. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the footnote to which Judge Posner
refers, the majority cites then-Chief Judge Markey for his statements that "a patent is not to
be equated with a monopoly" and the patent's right to exclude others is "'but a pseudonym
for "property."' " Id. at 1329 n.5 (quoting Chief Judge Howard T. Markey, Why Not the
Statute?, Address at University of Chicago Law School (April 26, 1983)).
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reconciliation can be achieved. I begin this somewhat daunting task by
examining the simply-property perspective's normative merits.
II. THE NORMATIVE MERITS OF THE
SIMPLY-PROPERTY PERSPECTIVE
In turning to the normative merits of the simply-property perspec-
tive, proponents of the simply-property perspective are met immediately
with Judge Posner's challenge that changing the names we attach to a
patent cannot change its real-world economic consequences. If a patent
excludes others from making, using, or selling the patented invention,
and thereby enables the patent-holder to charge more for the invention
than would otherwise be the case, those higher prices will generate the
same economic consequences as any other monopoly. Specifically,
some consumers will be unable to afford the higher "with patent" price
who could have afforded a lower "no patent" price. Whatever name you
attach, the welfare loss associated with these disappointed consumers is
a real economic consequence and a direct result of the patent.
If you find this response completely persuasive and are tempted to
ignore the simply-property perspective for that reason, I would urge you
to reconsider. Although Shakespeare's Juliet espoused the view that
names should not matter, she quickly learned that names matter a great
deal. Names carry with them an array of associations, assumptions, and
prejudices that can strongly influence our perception of the thing
named. In the legal world, the name "property" with its Blackstonian
visions of "that sole and despotic dominion""" carries powerful, gener-
ally positive connotations that can strongly influence even a wary mind,
while the word "monopoly" conjures opposing, generally negative im-
ages."26 Given the power of names, what we call a patent, whether
property or monopoly, matters very much.
127
Moreover, the simply-property perspective has an answer to the
"deadweight loss by any other name" argument. A proponent of the
simply-property perspective could point out that the high prices associ-
ated with certain patented inventions are no different from the high
125. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES section 2.
126. See In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1578 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Because of its anti-
trust connotations and association with illegality in connection therewith, [the term
'monopoly'] often evokes negative reactions inappropriate to a dispassionate analysis of
patent law.").
127. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 369-72,
417-20 (1999) [hereinafter Lunney, Trademark Monopolies] (recounting similar property-
monopoly debate over proper label for trademark protection and recounting substantial ex-
pansion of trademark law as property label became preferred).
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prices associated with certain parcels of land." That some land prices
are high does not convert land ownership into a monopoly or establish a
basis for characterizing the inability of some consumers to afford cer-
tain parcels as a deadweight loss."9
In response, a proponent of the traditional view would assert that
land and inventions are materially different. Land, the traditionalist
could assert, is a private good, characterized by rivalrous consump-
tion. "' On the other hand, the ideas, information, and concepts reflected
in the invention are a public good (or would be but for the patent), and
as such are characterized by non-rivalrous consumption.'31 Putting the
jargon to one side, there is only so much land, and whether we legally
assign ownership of a parcel to one person or to another or to no one at
128. Such a proponent could also point out that traditionalists are not always consistent
in how they define competition and how they define monopoly. Neither perfect competition
(where perfect substitutes exist nor perfect monopoly (where no substitutes exist) are com-
monly found outside of economic theory. Virtually all markets contain some degree of
competition and some degree of monopoly, and economists have developed a variety of
names to describe particular cases, such as imperfect competition, monopolistic competition,
and product differentiation. However, they often disagree as to which name is appropriate
for particular situations and as to the efficiency consequences of the names.
129. But see Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 127, at 370 n.19 (describing
concentration of land ownership in Hawaii that has been recognized by the Hawaii legisla-
ture as creating undesirable, monopoly-like consequences).
130. This probably overstates the case. Many individuals can often use the same parcel
of land without creating conflicts with other users. To the extent that land use is non-
rivalrous, this may justify exceptions to the private ownership regime for some such non-
rivalrous uses. See generally Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
(considering and rejecting various federal constitutional arguments challenging California
Supreme Court's interpretation of the California Constitution to permit speech related to
public concerns at privately-owned shopping mall).
131. Public goods analysis as such began with Professor Samuelson's 1954 article, The
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expen-
diture, 36 REv. OF ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). Although his analysis focused principally on
explaining and justifying government expenditure on, and provision, of certain goods, id. at
387-88, in his later articles, Professor Samuelson used "concerts" as an example of the type
of good to which his analysis might apply. See Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expen-
diture Theories, 40 REv. OF EON. & STAT. 332, 335 (1958); Paul A. Samuelson,
Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REv. OF ECON. & STAT.
350, 356 (1955). Professor Kenneth J. Arrow first applied a public good analysis directly to
intellectual property issues. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 616-19
(U. Princeton, 1962). Professor Samuelson used the term collective consumption goods in
his initial work. Professor Demsetz subsequently proposed a distinction between "public
goods," which are characterized by nonrivalrous consumption and an ability to exclude non-
payers from access to the good, and "collective goods," which are characterized by nonrival-
rous consumption and an inability to exclude non-payers. See Harold Demsetz, The Private
Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1970). Although Professor Sam-
uelson arguably incorporated both conditions, nonrivalrous consumption and non-
excludability, in his initial work, Professor Demsetz's "public good" label has become the
standard for a good exhibiting these two characteristics.
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all, the amount of land present remains unchanged. 32 In contrast, once
an invention has been made and disclosed, assigning the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention to one person will
reduce the invention's available supply. But for the patent, others would
take the information disclosed as a result of marketing the invention and
use it to create their own competing products, thereby increasing the
available supply. As a result, assigning a right to exclude with respect to
land does not create the scarcity of land; it merely recognizes the physi-
cal scarcity that already exists. 33 In contrast, assigning a right to
exclude with respect to an invention imposes a legal scarcity where
physical scarcity would not otherwise exist.3'
To counter this argument, a proponent of the simply-property per-
spective could admit that the invention once created is not physically
scarce, but insist that the talent, skill, and resources needed to create and
develop the invention in the first place are. Because these creative re-
sources are not sold directly, but are invested in the invention, imposing
legal scarcity on the invention is an indirect, but effective means for
creating a private market pricing mechanism for the creative resources
themselves. As these creative resources are physically scarce, using a
property right to enable private market pricing for them has the same
consequences and normative desirability as a private market system for
land and other tangible things. The patent system is not therefore creat-
ing an arbitrary and artificial scarcity (i.e. monopoly), but creating a
legal scarcity that serves as a pricing proxy for the physically scarce
creativity reflected in the invention (i.e. property).
A traditionalist would likely have to admit that this point has some
merit, as it essentially parallels the "incentive" justification for patents
found in the traditional perspective. But the traditionalist would none-
theless insist that the public good nature of invention justifies a special
property regime for inventions where the benefits from such a pricing
132. Assigning exclusive ownership may increase the value and utility of the land by
reducing transaction costs, see, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
57 Ami. EcON. Rev. 347, 354-59 (Papers & Proc. 1967), but that is a separate issue.
133. The statement that land is scarce is, of course, a reflection of the current situation
in metropolitan areas of our country. At times in our history, undeveloped land has been
plentiful in the sense that the supply of it so far exceeded the demand that it had little or no
value. Cf. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) ("The declaration stated
that Post, being in possession of certain dogs and hounds under his command, did, 'upon a
certain wild and uninhabited, unpossessed and waste land, called the beach, start one of
those noxious beasts called a fox' .... ").
134. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. Rev.
548, 562-63 (1969) ("The conventional reply to a comparison of monopoly to other rents is
that monopoly rents are the result of an artificial, contrived scarcity, rather than a natural
scarcity .... ").
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system are balanced against the deadweight losses it creates. As this is
the point where the traditionalist started, if the argument continues at
all, the circle of arguments will simply begin again. There are branches
and permutations available for each of these arguments, but in the end,
each perspective is self-contained, offering all of the answers that its
adherents believe they need. As a result, the two perspectives appear to
have little in common and no basis for mediating their differences.
I believe, however, that these two perspectives share substantial
common ground and can be reconciled. The key, I believe, lies in under-
standing the basis for the presumed normative desirability of property
generally. In a legal sense, any set of legal rights between an individual
and others pertaining to a thing is "property."'35 Thus, a patent issued
under a legal regime where nonobviousness requires only a trivial ad-
vance over the prior art is property, just as a patent issued under a legal
regime where nonobviousness requires a substantial advance over the
prior art is also property. If the right to exclude is "the essence of prop-
erty," then the royal "patents" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
granting favored courtiers the exclusive right to import, export, or sell
particular goods were property. Additionally, if the government were to
enact a law stating that only Microsoft could sell operating software for
PC-compatible computers in interstate commerce, 3 6 Microsoft's rights
under that law would be property as well. While all of these examples
constitute property, not all of them are normatively desirable. Property
is a powerful concept in our society because private ownership of re-
sources has generally proven a useful and desirable institution. The
implicit assumption in the simply-property perspective is that a patent is
normatively desirable because it is sufficiently similar to other forms of
property to claim, by analogy, their desirability. Yet the mere fact that
some property has proven desirable does not mean that all legal rights
that might qualify as property are desirable.'37
Before deeming such legal rights desirable, we must ensure that the
proposed property regime at issue advances some socially desired ob-
jective. From an economic perspective, the goal of a property regime is
135. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, introductory note (1936).
136. If the example seems far-fetched, keep in mind that that is the effective result of
Microsoft's copyright on its operating system given the dominating nature of the network
effects in the operating system software market.
137. The last example should also remind us that property and monopoly are not oppo-
sites, as so many seem to assume. Property may sometimes be traded in a market where
competing substitutes are available, and in that case, we would have property and competi-
tion. In other cases, property may be traded in markets where no competing substitutes are
available, and in those cases, we would have property and monopoly. See also Lunney, Re-
examining Copyright, supra note 87, at 518 n.143; Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra
note 127, at 370 n.19.
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to ensure the allocation of resources to their highest value use. Private
ownership of tangible things has proven to serve this goal reasonably
well, as a general matter. For the patent system to lay justifiable claim
to property's normative appeal, patents must tend, as property more
generally does, to promote the efficient allocation of scarce resources to
their highest value use. As suggested above, creativity is the scarce re-
source we are trying to allocate through the patent system. The question
becomes how do we define the nonobviousness standard within the
context of the patent system to help ensure that patents lead individuals
to allocate their creativity to its highest value use.
A. Paying for Creativity: Innovation Rents
The basic economic principles governing the allocation of resources
under conditions of private ownership are reasonably well known.' In
economic theory, private ownership leads to the optimal allocation of
resources only where all property is traded in perfectly competitive
markets with all costs and benefits fully internalized (the "perfect com-
petition model"). 39 Under these conditions, resources will be allocated
to various markets until each market reaches equilibrium at that point
where price, marginal cost, and marginal utility for the last unit of pro-
duction are all equal. Despite reaching equilibrium at this seemingly
optimal point, the perfect competition model necessarily eliminates any
incentive for innovation. Under conditions of perfect competition, as
soon as a new product is introduced, competitors instantly introduce
perfect substitutes, price falls to marginal cost, and the innovator has no
opportunity to recover anything for the creativity she invested in the
new product. As a result, under conditions of perfect competition, pat-
ents, copyrights or some other form of legal protection would be strictly
necessary for any non-gratuitous innovation to occur."
138. Much of the following tracks a similar model that I have used to analyze the
proper scope of copyright protection. See Lunney, Reexamining Copyright, supra note 87, at
582-89. In this analysis, I will assume that: (1) individuals will dedicate available resources
to those uses that they expect will bring the highest private return for those resources; (2)
uncertainty is not present, so that an individual's expectations as to potential returns are in
fact accurate; and (3) price discrimination is not possible. See id. at 582-83.
139. See, e.g., JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 95, 317
(1933); R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 23 R~v.
EcON. STUD. 11, 16-17 (1956).
140. See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 94, at 444 ("If pure and perfect competition in the
strictest sense prevailed continuously ... incentives for invention and innovation would be
fatally defective without a patent system or some equivalent substitute.").
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Fortunately for innovation, perfect competition is rarely found out-
side of economic theory.14 1 In the real world, there is almost always
some time between an innovator's introduction of a new product and the
offering of competing substitutes by others. During this lead-time pe-
riod, if consumers perceive the new product as desirably different'
from existing products, the innovator will have the opportunity to
charge a price for her new product somewhat more than her marginal
cost."43 The availability of this economic rent provides the innovator
some opportunity to obtain payment for the creativity she invested in
the new product. '4
Sooner or later, however, this lead-time period will end. It may end
when others notice the innovator's rents and seek a share of those rents
by introducing competing products ("copying competitors"). Alterna-
tively, the lead-time period may end when another, acting completely
independently of the original innovator, happens upon the same new
product and brings it to market simultaneously with or soon after the
141. See, e.g., EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
214-15 (1933) (noting that pure competition "may no longer be regarded as in any sense an
'ideal' for purposes of welfare economics" and that "[iln many cases it would be quite im-
possible to establish it"); EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, TOWARD A MORE GENERAL THEORY OF
VALUE 93 (1957) ("pure [e.g. perfect] competition is evidently a theoretical concept, and ...
the practical-minded economist is often ready enough to point out that 'no one has ever ad-
vocated that it be established' "); PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 39, 43-44 (6th ed. 1964)
("A cynic might say of perfect competition what Bernard Shaw said of Christianity: 'The
only trouble with it is that it has never been tried.' ... All economic life is a blend of com-
petitive and monopoly elements.... It would be humanly impossible, therefore, to attempt to
create perfect competition by law."); SCHERER, supra note 94, at 24. A few markets, such as
grain fanning, are thought to come close. See SAMtUELSON, at 43 (noting that "imperfect
competition" is the rule, "except possibly [for] the millions of farmers who individually
produce a negligible fraction of the total crop"); ROBERT HANEY SCOTT & NIc NIGRO, PRIN-
CIPLES OF ECONOMICS 178-79 (1982) ("Perfect competition does not exist in the real world,
although several major industries approximate it surprisingly well. Among them are farming
142. From an economics perspective, if consumers do not prefer the new product to
existing products or the new product is not less expensive to create than what it replaces,
then it has no social value. Moreover, if the invention does not provide some financial ad-
vantage compared to existing goods or methods of production, the grant or denial of a patent
will not affect its value.
143. See, e.g., Lunney, Reexamining Copyright, supra note 87, at 582-85.
144. If our investor devoted her resources entirely to some non-creative endeavor, she
would likely face immediate and near-perfect competition, and would therefore not earn any
innovation rents. At the same time, as long as she was not unusually inefficient, her com-
petitors could not obtain any copying advantage, but would have to do their own work. For
such a non-creative endeavor, our investor would not have the prospect of earning an unusu-
ally high return through innovation rents, but neither would she face the prospect of losing
her investment as a result of copying competitors or another's simultaneous invention. In
contrast, an investment that involves creativity offers both the opportunity of unusual profit
if the innovation rents prove substantial and the risk of losing money if the innovation rents
prove insufficient to cover the product's costs.
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first innovator ("simultaneous invention"). In either case, these com-
peting products are likely to duplicate the appeal of the innovator's new
product more closely than preexisting goods. These goods are also
likely to carry a lower price than the original.' Their introduction will
likely therefore reduce the price that the innovator can profitably charge
and the associated rents she may earn for her no-longer new product.'
Indeed, if consumers perceive these competing products as perfect sub-
stitutes for the original, then prices in the new product market will fall
to marginal cost and no further innovation rents will be available. Em-
pirical studies have shown, however, that the innovator typically retains
some ability to price above marginal cost and to earn corresponding
rents even after competitive entry occurs.'47 But our innovator will likely
find that the entry of these new competitors will reduce the extent of the
rents available in the post-entry period.'
The combination of rents earned by an innovator in the lead-time
and post-entry periods represents payment for the creativity invested in
the new product. Moreover, these "innovation rents" will accrue even in
the absence of a patent or some other form of "intellectual" property.
The amount of innovation rents available, or expected to be available, in
any given case is an empirical question that will vary from case to case
and from industry to industry. But, as a general rule, the amount of in-
145. Economic theory predicts three possible price levels at which the market may set-
tle following competitive entry. First, prices may remain at the price set by the innovator, if
competitors follow the pricing lead of the innovator and seek market share through non-price
competition. Second, prices may fall to the level necessary for the competitors to recover
their own creativity investments. Third, prices may fall to marginal cost. Economists typi-
cally assume that prices will fall following competitive entry, particularly in the case of
copying competitors. See also infra text accompanying notes 153-154. In the end, what
effect entry will have on market price and market share is an empirical issue - which is an
economist's way of saying she has no clue, but will be happy to give you her opinion. What
empirical evidence there is suggests that the first result will usually occur only where the
innovator is the single dominant firm in the industry and the competitive entry comes from a
number of much smaller firms. The empirical evidence also suggests that the third pricing
possibility becomes increasingly likely as the number of market entrants of similar size in-
creases.
146. In this "post-entry" period, the introduction of these competing products offers
consumers a choice. If the innovator tries to maintain her original price, consumers can
switch to one of the lower priced, competing products now available.
147. See generally Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pio-
neering Brands, 72 AM. ECON. Rv. 349 (1982).
148. Moreover, advertising and other methods of product differentiation may enable an
individual to earn rents even without innovation, simply by differentiating an existing prod-
uct. Efforts at product differentiation may prove easier or more successful when they build
on an innovative product, but in determining rents attributable to the innovation, we should
be careful to limit rents from this post-entry period to those additional rents earned because
of innovation and exclude those rents that could have been earned even in the absence of
innovation.
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novation rents available will turn on: (1) the social value of the inven-
tion;.49 (2) the extent of the lead-time period available; (3) the extent of
the cost savings competitors can obtain by copying (the "copying ad-
vantage"); (4) the extent to which the innovator can differentiate her
product in the post-entry period; and (5) the presence of any natural or
network monopoly characteristics in the new product's market.
The social value of the invention and the innovation rents available
tend to rise and fall together because both are functions of: (i) the de-
mand for the new product (i.e. increased quantities sold), and (ii) the
extent to which consumers will pay more for the new product than its
marginal cost (i.e. increased per unit rent).5 If we measure social value
as a function of consumers' willingness to pay, then an increased de-
mand for a new product or an increased willingness to pay a higher per
unit rent would reflect increased social value. Similarly, because total
innovation rents are the product of the quantity sold and the rent earned
per unit, increased demand and increased per unit rent also increase the
innovation rents available from a new product. On the other hand, as
these two factors or either of them decrease, both the social value and
the innovation rents associated with the new product will tend to de-
crease. As a result, a new product with higher social value will tend to
generate higher innovation rents than a new product with lower social
value, ceteris paribus.
The length of the lead-time period will also affect the innovation
rents associated with a new product. With a longer lead-time period, an
innovator will make more of her sales during the lead-time period, when
her price is likely higher, and will likely make more sales overall, as she
will have the market to herself longer before she must share it with new
entrants. With a shorter lead-time period, the opposite is true. A shorter
lead-time period may also reduce the extent to which the innovator can
149. I am using the traditional economic definition for social value where social value
equals the area under the demand curve for the product less the product's costs.
150. See Lunney, Reexamining Copyright, supra note 87, at 556-57,559 & n.283. I am
assuming that the innovation is for a new product. If the innovation is a new method, either
more efficient or less expensive, to produce an existing good, then the same lead-time rents
will accrue. In this case, the rents will accrue, because while the market price for the good
will presumably remain the same (unless the innovator is the marginal producer of the good),
the innovator's marginal cost for producing the good will decrease. However, where the
rents available to the creator of a new product represent only a fraction of the social value
associated with the innovation, the "cost-saving" rents associated with the new method will
often encompass the entire social value of the innovation. A new method for producing an
existing product may also be more difficult for competitors to copy as the new method may
not be discoverable by reverse engineering of its end product. See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et
al., Appropriating Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PA'ElS
ON ECON. ACTiVITY 783, 794-95 (1987) (presenting survey results that revealed belief that
patents were much less effective among available protections for processes).
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charge a price above marginal cost in the lead-time period because, as
the lead-time period becomes shorter, some consumers who would oth-
erwise have purchased during the lead-time period may decide to wait
for the lower prices of the post-entry period.'5' Although the actual or
expected lead-time period for any given invention will depend upon the
particular circumstances presented, we can identify three considerations
that will usually dictate the likely duration of the lead-time period. First,
as a field becomes more crowded with others pursuing similar lines of
research, and second, as the social value of the invention increases, we
should expect a shorter lead-time period. Both factors suggest that oth-
ers are more likely to be actively looking to solve the same problem as
our innovator. Both therefore increase the risk that someone else will
happen on the same solution at about the same time, or that another will
quickly identify and begin copying our innovator's solution when it ap-
pears on the market. Third, as our innovator's new product becomes
more easily copied, we should expect a shorter lead-time period. Greater
ease of copying usually means that it will take less time for another to
copy the new product and introduce their own competing products.' 2
The copying advantage affects the innovation rents available be-
cause it plays a key role in determining the likely price for the new
product in the post-entry period. Although copying competitors do not
usually invest as much creativity to copy as the innovator did to inno-
vate, even copying often entails some creative investment.'53 Copying
competitors will likely try to set a price for their products that will en-
able them to recover their own, albeit somewhat smaller, creative
investments.- 4 They will therefore try to set a price somewhat above
their marginal cost. As their copying advantage increases, these com-
151. See Lunney, Reexamining Copyright, supra note 87, at 589 & n. 377.
152. Even if a car and a computer program entail similar absolute levels of creativity,
someone could, in the absence of a copyright, begin offering competing copies of the com-
puter program far more quickly than someone could begin offering competing copies of the
car. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Lotus v. Borland: Copyright and Computer Programs, 70
TUL. L. Rav. 2397, 2428 (1996) [hereinafter Lunney, Lotus v. Borland].
153. See EDWIN MANSFIELD ET AL., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, PRODUCTIVITY, AND
ECONOMIC POLICY 132-53 (1982) (summarizing empirical investigation of imitator's cost
advantage); Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91
EcON. J. 907, 909 (1981) (noting average ratio of imitation costs to innovation costs of
"about 0.65" in various industries where products receive patent protection).
154. In the parallel invention case, the parallel inventor, unless unusually more or less
efficient at innovation than the original, will likely incur innovation expenses similar to
those incurred by the original innovator. Thus, we might expect prices to fall somewhat in
the case of entry through independent invention, but perhaps not to fall as much as in the
case of copying competitors. Even with parallel invention, however, market forces may lead
both the original inventor and the parallel inventor to marginal cost pricing where neither
can recover their creative investment.
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petitors will rely more on what they have copied from the innovator and
will invest less creativity of their own. These competitors will therefore
be able to charge a lower price while still recouping their creative in-
vestments. Falling prices for competitors will in turn increase pressure
on the innovator to reduce the price for her product or risk losing market
share, and will thereby reduce the innovator's ability to obtain innova-
tion rents during the post-entry period.
The last two factors, product differentiation and natural or network
monopoly character, are general sources of market power in the econ-
omy that can arise in established product markets, as well as in markets
for new products. Yet, creating a new product may enhance an individ-
ual's opportunity to earn rents associated with these factors. Efforts 'at
product differentiation aim to persuade consumers that one product is
desirably different than others available. These efforts may prove easier
or more successful when tied to an original innovative product.'55 Simi-
larly, where a product market demonstrates natural or network
monopoly characteristics, being first into the market may enable the
innovator to establish long-term dominance of the market.
Although there is sharp debate over the precise extent of the inno-
vation rents available and the circumstances in which they are sufficient
to ensure the proper level of innovative activity,'56 the availability of
such rents establishes that some creative investment will occur even in
the absence of the expectation of a patent. Thus, contrary to the sugges-
tion of the perfect competition model, patents, copyrights, or some other
form of legal protection for the information contained in a creative
product are not strictly necessary to ensure that some non-gratuitous
creative work will occur. Yet, the innovation rents available in the ab-
sence of a patent may not prove sufficient in every case to cover the
innovation costs present. Patents may therefore prove desirable to en-
sure that enough innovation occurs.
Granting a patent will tend to increase the available innovation rents
by prohibiting others from making, using, or selling the new product as
it is set forth in the patent claims. In some cases, this may completely
exclude others from a relevant product market.' More typically, a
155. See Schmalensee, supra note 147, at 349; see also Cooper & Kleinschmidt, supra
note 112, at 182 ("The most important product variables [that correlate with] Financial Per-
formance are [first, whether] [t]he product was superior to competitive products in the eyes
of consumers.").
156. Despite this debate, surveys tend to establish that those involved in research per-
ceive secrecy and lead-time advantages as providing more effective protection of
technological advantage than patents. See Levin et al., supra note 150, at 798.
157. To understand some of the difficulties that may arise in resolving this issue, com-
pare Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, in 8 REs. L. & EcON. 31
2000-20011
404 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 7:363
patent may simply require competitors to work around the patent pro-
tection to identify an alternative product that does not infringe the patent
yet still proves acceptable to consumers as a substitute for the original.'
Even such limited protection will likely increase the innovation rents
available. First, such limited protection will likely lengthen the innova-
tor's lead-time as a competitor will usually need more time to work
around a patent than simply to copy a new product. Second, it will likely
increase the competitor's own creative investment, again because
working around the patent is a more difficult and time-consuming task
than simply copying. Increased costs for the competitors may reduce
their ability to undercut the innovator's price, deter some competitors'
entry,'59 and increase the post-entry price the innovator may profitably
charge. Third, where a competitor must work-around a patent, the inno-
vator may more easily persuade consumers that material differences
remain between her original and the competitor's imitation. This may
facilitate her ability to differentiate her product, and thereby enable her
to increase the price she may charge and the rents she may collect dur-
ing the post-entry period.
Given this background, we can now develop a simple model of in-
vestment decisions to explore the effects of patents on the allocation of
creative resources.
B. A Simple Model of Investment Decisions
To examine the relationship between innovation rents, patent pro-
tection, and the allocation of resources, consider a situation where an
individual is trying to decide between two investments. One investment
will lead to Product A; the second to Product B. Both products will re-
quire the investment of both creative and non-creative resources, but
Product B will require somewhat more creative and somewhat less non-
creative resources than Product A. If our individual is otherwise indif-
ferent between these two investments and her available resources may
(1986) (asserting that Xerox's patents on its copying technologies gave it no market power),
with F. M. Scherer, Comment on Edmund Kitch, in id. at 51-57 (ridiculing Kitch's conclu-
sions).
158. See MANSFIELD ET A.., supra note 153, at 153 ("The median estimated increase in
the ratio of imitation cost to innovation cost was 11 percent.").
159. See id. at 149-50; Lunney, Reexamining Copyright, supra note 87, at 609 n.416,
611 n.420, & 612 n.423 (noting that under given assumptions number of copying competi-
tors that entered market fell from 6.14 to 2.13 to 1.40 as scope of copyright protection for
original work increased).
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be used in either a creative or non-creative capacity,' 60 she will pick the
investment with the higher risk-adjusted return.
Given the balance of creative and non-creative resources required
for these two products, we should expect our investor to earn more in-
novation rents from Product A than from Product B, if the two products
are otherwise comparable in terms of total cost and social value
("otherwise comparable"). This follows from the fact that investments
in creativity can usually be copied more quickly and at less expense
than non-creative investments. Simply as a practical matter, the physical
task of copying the ideas, design, or other information to which a crea-
tive investment leads is likely to prove easier than the physical task of
duplicating the non-creative work involved in building the product it-
self. A competitor can often capture the ideas and information generated
by creative investments simply by carefully examining the resulting
product, without having to duplicate the time-consuming research her-
self. In contrast, there is no similar shortcut for the time required to
duplicate physically the new product. 6 ' Because the Product A invest-
ment required relatively more non-creative resources, while the Product
B investment required relatively less, it will likely take a competitor
longer to physically duplicate Product A than Product B. For similar
reasons, a competitor will also likely obtain a greater cost advantage by
copying Product B. 162 Both the shorter lead-time and the increased
copying advantage for Product B indicate that the innovation rents
available from an investment in Product B will likely prove lower than
those available from investing in Product A.
Because of the increased innovation rents available, our investor
will likely devote her resources to the more attractive investment-
Product A. We can generalize this result as the following principle:
Given a choice of investing in two creative products that are otherwise
160. This second assumption is not likely true as a general rule. Different people have
natural gifts and have trained those gifts in different ways. One hour of work from someone
who has worked all her life as a farmer would not yield the same result if applied to the de-
sign of antilock brakes or economic theory, any more than one hour of work from someone
who has worked all her life as automobile engineer or economics professor would yield the
same result if applied to plowing a field.
161. Sometimes, the information is the product, and in such cases, copying may require
little or no non-creative work. See Lunney, Lotus v. Borland, supra note 152, at 2428-29
(comparing the division of cost between creative and non-creative resources for the design of
a car to the division for a novel). An example might be digitally-stored and digitally-
transmitted information.
162. If copying allows a competitor to rely entirely on our innovator's creativity in-
vestment and avoid any creative investment of her own, the competitor's costs for her
Product B would be 60 percent of our innovator's. If a competitor can obtain similar costs
savings (i.e. the entire creative investment) by copying Product A, the competitor's costs for
her Product A would be 80 percent of our innovator's.
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comparable, an investor will earn more innovation rents and a higher
private return by investing in the product in which creativity is a smaller
fraction of the total product cost.'63
We can extend this principle to explore the issue of nonobviousness
and allocative efficiency by comparing a series of investment decisions
made with respect to two sets of potential investments. Each set consists
of five different potential investments, ranked by decreasing social
value. We will further assume that the corresponding investments in the
two sets are of equal social value, and that: (1) each requires the same
total investment of resources (5 units); (2) each entails some creative
and some non-creative resources; and (3) the second set of investments
requires more creative resources relative to non-creative resources than
the first set of investments (1 creative unit and 4 non-creative units for
Set 1 investments; 2 creative units and 3 non-creative units for Set 2
investments). Table I reflects these assumptions.
TABLE I
INVESTMENT OPTIONS
Set 1 Resources Set 2 Resources Social Value
Investments Req'd Investments Req'd
Creative: Creative:
Non-Creative Non-Creative
1-A 1:4 2-A 2:3 10
1-B 1:4 2-B 2:3 8.75
1-C 1:4 2-C 2:3 7.5
1-D 1:4 2-D 2:3 6.25
1-E 1:4 2-E 2:3 5
Although Table 1 identifies what each investment is worth to soci-
ety, rational, profit-maximizing individuals do not respond, directly to
the social value of an investment, but to the private return. We therefore
need some sense for what each investment returns to its investors. Given
our analysis thus far, we know that innovation rents increase as the so-
cial value of the resulting product increases. We should therefore expect
a greater private return on investment 1-A than on investment 1-B, and
a greater private return on investment 2-A than on investment 2-B. We
also know that innovation rents for otherwise comparable investments
will tend to decrease as the creativity invested increases as a fraction of
the resulting product's total cost. Thus, we should expect a greater pri-
163. See Lunney, Reexamining Copyright, supra note 87, at 590.
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vate return on investment 1-A than on investment 2-A, and a greater
private return on investment 1-B than on investment 2-B.
This second difference between our two sets of investments creates
the potential for a Set 1 investment with a lower social value to never-
theless have a higher private return than a Set 2 investment. For
example, if we compare investments 1-B and 2-A, we must resolve two
competing influences. On the one hand, because investment 2-A gener-
ates a higher social value than investment 1-B, it should tend to generate
somewhat higher innovation rents.' On the other, because creativity
represents a higher fraction of the total cost in investment 2-A, the new
product resulting from investment 2-A will likely prove more easily and
more quickly copied than the new product resulting from investment I-
B. The greater ease with which the product resulting from investment 2-
A can be copied will tend to reduce the innovation rents from invest-
ment 2-A compared to those from investment 1-B. Which effect will
predominate is an empirical matter, but where, as here, the creativity
invested as a fraction of total cost is substantially higher for one product
than for another, there is good reason to believe that the greater ease of
copying factor will predominate. To the extent that it does, investment
2-A will generate a lower private return than investment 1-B."
We know empirically that in some cases, the innovation rents avail-
able without a patent will prove sufficient to attract the necessary
investment to the most valuable inventive activity ("desirable inven-
tion"), and that in other cases, they will not. We can use Set 1 and Set 2
to reflect this empirical observation by assuming that the innovation
rents for Set 1 investments are sufficient to attract the necessary re-
sources without a patent, but that the Set 2 investment innovation rents
are not. In other words, we will assume that the greater ease of copying
factor predominates and that the private return available for the Set 2
investments will be less than the private return available for a Set 1 in-
vestment, even where the Set 1 investment generates lower social value.
With this background, we can now explore the interaction between
innovation rents, the availability of patent protection, and allocative ef-
ficiency by considering three cases. In the first case, we will assume that
no patent protection is available. This is our set-up case, and is meant
merely to illustrate our assumption that in the absence of patent protec-
tion, individuals will invest in the Set 1 investments, but not the Set 2
164. See supra text accompanying notes 150-151.
165. If the ease of copying factor predominates, then in the absence of a patent, the Set
2 investments are so easy to copy that they will earn little or no innovation rents, or alterna-
tively, they may earn some innovation rents, but still less than can be earned by Set 1
investments that generate much lower social values.
2000-2001]
408 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 7:363
investments. In the second, we will assume that patent protection is
available for the new products resulting from the Set 2 investments.
This second case is meant to illustrate the results where we award patent
protection only to those inventions that would not have been made or
disclosed but for the added incentive of a patent. It reflects Graham's
"weeding out" understanding of the nonobviousness requirement. Fi-
nally, in the third case, we will assume that patent protection is
available for the new products resulting from both sets of investments.
This third case is meant to illustrate a system where we award patents to
every new and useful advance over the prior art. It reflects a low stan-
dard for nonobviousness where anyone who contributes something new
and useful is presumptively entitled to a property right (i.e. a patent)
reflecting her contribution.
Moreover, because the model will focus solely on allocative effi-
ciency, we will introduce a resource constraint into the model by
assuming that for these two sets of investments, there are only twenty
units of resources available (which can be used interchangeably either
as creative or non-creative resources). We know, given the social values
associated with the investments available reflected in Table 1, that these
twenty units would be optimally allocated if invested in 1-A, 1-B, 2-A,
and 2-B. Such allocation generates the highest social value given the
resources available. The approach to the nonobviousness issue that leads
to such an allocation best satisfies the objective of a property system.
We can therefore identify the appropriate standard of nonobviousness
by seeing which approach better promotes allocative efficiency.
Case One-No Patent Protection: As discussed, we have assumed
that the innovation rents available in the absence of a patent are suffi-
cient to attract resources to the Set 1 investments, but not the Set 2
investments. We made this assumption not because it is convenient or
because it assumes the desired answer but because it corresponds to our
real world observation that innovation rents available without a patent
are sometimes sufficient to encourage desirable invention and some-
times not. Although the precise numbers we use are not important," one
166. Although the precise numbers set forth in the table are simply for illustration, they
must satisfy three requirements. First, within a given set of investments, private return must
increase as social value increases. Thus, the private return for investment I-A must be higher
than that for l-B, and 1-B must be higher than l-C, and so on. Second, the private returns for
each Set 2 investment must be lower than the private return for the corresponding Set 1 in-
vestment. Thus, the private return for investment 2-A must be lower than I-A. Third, given
our assumption that Set 1 and Set 2 investments represent our two sides of the innovation
rent divide, private returns for each Set 2 investment must prove insufficient to attract the
necessary resources. Here I have used private returns for each Set 2 investment of below 5
on the assumption that each unit of resource has a price of one, and thus that a private return
of at least 5 is necessary to attract 5 units of resources.
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plausible set of private return pay-offs for the investments available
under these assumptions is as follows:
CASE #I:
PRIVATE RETURNS WITHOUT PATENTS
Set 1 Private Return Set 2 Private Return
'v
1-A 6 2-A 4.5
1-B 5.75 2-B 4.3125
1-C 5.5 2-C 4.125
1-D 5.25 2-D 3.9375
1-E 5.0 2-E 3.75
Given this set of pay-offs for the available investments, we would
expect the property system, in the absence of any patent protection, to
lead individuals to allocate their resources to investments 1-A, 1-B, 1-C,
and 1-D. Because each investment requires five units of resources, with
a total of only twenty units available, and because the private return on
investment 1-D is higher than that available from any Set 2 investment,
such an allocation of the resources would generate the highest private
return for the investors. Although such an allocation generates the high-
est private return, it is inefficient. It leads individuals to devote
resources to investments 1-C and 1-D that would have produced more
value to society had they been devoted to investments 2-A and 2-B in-
stead. Thus, under our assumptions, the absence of any patent protection
leads to allocative inefficiency.
Case Two-Patent Protection for Set 2 Investments Only: In this
case, we will grant patents to the products resulting from Set 2 invest-
ments only, in an attempt to follow Graham's suggestion of awarding
patents only where the invention would not have been disclosed or de-
vised but for the inducement of a patent. As discussed, a patent will
increase the innovation rents because it makes the patented invention
more difficult to copy. As a result, awarding patents to Set 2 invest-
ments will increase the innovation rents and hence the overall private
returns associated with the Set 2 investments. Indeed, if we manage to
167. Total return for the two products are calculated by assuming that our investor ex-
pects a total private return of innovation rents plus a cost-based payment for the non-creative
investment. I have assumed that the innovation rents will equal 20 percent of each Set I
investment's associated social value and 15 percent of each Set 2 investment's social value.
The reduced innovation rents associated with the Set 2 investments correspond to our as-
sumption that the greater ease of copying factor will predominate.
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give those patents the proper scope,' we can bring the private returns
for the Set 2 investments more closely in line with the otherwise compa-
rable Set 1 investment. Again, the precise numbers we use are not
important,' 69 but one plausible set of private return pay-offs under these
assumptions is as follows:
CASE #2:
PRIVATE RETURNS WITH PATENTS FOR SET 2 ONLY
Set 1 Private Return Set 2 Private Return
1-A 6 2-A 6
1-B 5.75 2-B 5.625
1-C 5.5 2-C 5.25
1-D 5.25 2-D 4.875
1-E 5 2-E 4.5
Given this set of available pay-offs, we would expect the property
system, which now includes patents for Set 2 investments, to lead indi-
viduals to allocate the available resources in investments 1-A, 1-B, 2-A,
and 2-B. Such an allocation generates the highest private return for our
investors. As this allocation is also the socially optimal result under the
circumstances, a patent system that grants patent protection to Set 2 in-
vestments would promote allocative efficiency and could fully claim the
normative desirability of property generally.
Case #3-Patents for Both Sets of Investments: In this case, we will
grant patents to the products resulting from both Set 1 and 2 invest-
ments, in an attempt to follow the simply-property perspective's initial
assumption that any new and useful advance merits a property right (i.e.
a patent) reflecting the contribution. As discussed, patent protection will
168. The issue of a patent's proper scope is beyond the ambit of this essay. I would
only say that even if we do not get the scope exactly right, with the result that private returns
are not precisely comparable for inventions with otherwise comparable costs and social
value, the patent system will tend to improve allocative efficiency so long as it brings private
returns more in line for otherwise comparable inventions.
169. Again, the precise numbers given for the private returns are simply illustrative, but
thenumbers must satisfy three conditions. First, within each set of investments, private re-
turn must increase as the social value of the invention increases. Second, the availability of
patent protection of proper scope will increase the private return of Set 2 investments com-
pared to the no-patent case. Third, if the patent protection is of proper scope, than granting
patents to the Set 2 investments will also bring the private return for each Set 2 investment
closer to the private return for the corresponding Set 1 investment.
170. To reflect the grant of the patent for Set 2 investments, I have increased the inno-
vation rents available to the Set 2 investments from 15 percent to 30 percent of the
investment's social value.
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increase the innovation rents associated with a creative investment. As a
result, granting patents to the products resulting from both sets of in-
vestments will therefore lead to increased innovation rents and hence
increased private returns for both sets of investments compared to Case
#1."' If patent protection provides comparable increases in innovation
rents for both sets of investments, one plausible set of private return
pay-offs under these assumptions is as follows:
CASE #3:
PRIVATE RETURNS WITH PATENTS FOR BOTH
Set 1 Total Returnm7 3  Set 2 Total Return
1-A 7.5 2-A 6
1-B 7.0625 2-B 5.625
1-C 6.625 2-C 5.25
1-D 6.1875 2-D 4.875
1-E 5.75 2-E 4.5
Given this set of available pay-offs, we would expect the property
system, which now includes patents for both Set 1 and 2 investments, to
lead individuals to allocate their resources to investments 1-A, l-B, 1-C,
and 1-D. As in Case #1, such an allocation generates the highest private
return for the resources available. However, also as in Case #1, such an
allocation is not efficient. Such a property regime leads individuals to
devote resources to investments 1-C and 1-D that would have generated
more value for society if devoted to investments 2-A and 2-B.
Thus we have shown that providing patent protection for both sets
of investments would not promote allocative efficiency. Rather, it
171. I have assumed that the Case #3 private returns for the Set 2 investments will re-
main the same as they were in Case #2.
172. Again, the precise figures given for private returns are simply illustrative, but the
figures must satisfy three conditions. First, within each set of investments, private return
must increase as the social value of the invention increases. Second, the availability of patent
protection for Set I investments will increase the private return for such investments com-
pared to the no-patent cases. Third, unless courts are going to vary the scope of protection
available for Set 1 patents and Set 2 patents, then patent protection should lead to similar
increases in the innovation rents available for each set of investments.
173. There are two ways we might think of the increase in the Set 2 innovation rents.
First, we might look at the increase from 15 percent to 30 percent as a doubling, and hence
double the Set 1 innovation rents to reflect a similar increase (from 20 to 40 percent). Or,
second, we might consider the increase a 15 percentage point increase, and increase the Set 1
innovation rents similarly (from 20 to 35 percent). Because the second paints a more opti-
mistic picture of the efficiency effects from granting patents to both, and is therefore the
more conservative assumption given my perspective (patents only for some), I will adopt the
second approach.
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would generate a result as inefficient as having no patents at all. By
granting patents for every new and useful product, the patent system
would lead individuals to devote their scarce creative resources to less
valuable activities. Such an approach cannot therefore claim normative
desirability by pretending that it is "simply" property.
C. Initial Implications of the Model for
the Nonobviousness Standard
The above model answers our first question regarding the nonobvi-
ousness standard: Patents should only be granted and enforced for some,
not all, technical advances. In short, Graham was fight. We should grant
patents only to those desirable inventions that would not have been dis-
closed or devised but for the inducement of a patent. Moreover, to reach
this conclusion, we need not assume that a patent is a monopoly or that
a patent otherwise creates undesirable deadweight losses. Our model
focuses on the patent system solely as a component of the property sys-
tem more generally, and uses that property-based framework to examine
which nonobviousness standard better promotes the allocation of crea-
tivity to its highest value use. Thus, the model and its resulting
conclusions do not rely on the assumption that a patent is properly char-
acterized as a monopoly. For this reason, the model and its conclusions
are fully consonant with former Chief Judge Markey's perspective that a
patent is simply property.
From this property perspective, the model identifies the inconsis-
tency that may arise between private return and social value for
otherwise comparable investments in the absence of patent protection as
the central justification for a patent system. In the absence of patent
protection, some innovative investments will earn sufficient innovation
rents to prove attractive; others will not, even where they would prove
more valuable to society. This dichotomy creates the risk that creative
resources will be devoted to socially less valuable innovation. By
granting patent protection only to those desirable inventive efforts that
would not earn sufficient innovation rents in the absence of a patent to
prove attractive, we can correct this inconsistency between public and
private return, and ensure that innovative investments that generate
similar social value for a similar expenditure of resources also generate
similar private returns. By correcting this inconsistency, patent protec-
tion will tend to lead individuals to allocate their creative resources to
their highest value use and will thereby serve, like property more gener-
ally, to promote allocative efficiency. On the other hand, granting
patents to all innovative efforts will maintain this inconsistency and will
not therefore promote allocative efficiency. To complete the picture, the
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following section attempts to define a nonobviousness standard pre-
cisely tailored to these allocative efficiency concerns.
D. Defining Nonobviousness: The Creative
Investment Fraction
When we turn to the question of which new products and processes
should satisfy the nonobviousness requirement and receive a patent, our
three Cases suggest that the dominant consideration should be the crea-
tivity invested in the new product or process as a fraction of the
invention's total cost as marketed (the "creative investment fraction").
This is the key difference between the Set 1 and Set 2 investments that
leads to the variation in the private return available for otherwise com-
parable products. As it is this variation in private and social returns that,
if left unaddressed, would lead to the misallocation of scarce resources
that the patent system seeks to redress, the creative investment fraction
largely dictates the circumstances under which granting a patent is
likely to promote allocative efficiency.174 The creative investment frac-
tion is also, from the traditional perspective, the single factor that best
identifies "those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but
for the inducement of a patent."' 75 Despite their differences, both the
property perspective and the traditional perspective thus essentially
agree on the proper approach to the obviousness issue.
In looking at the creativity invested criteria itself, the creativity in-
vested should be considered as a fraction of total costs, rather than as an
absolute sum, because innovation rents, as with rents more generally in
economics, are typically expressed as, and earned as, a percentage over
marginal cost.76 An advanced degree in economics is not required to
understand why economists treat rents in this fashion. Even with near-
perfect competition, a competitor can sustain a one-dollar mark-up on a
174. For the reasons discussed previously, whether the invention takes place in a
crowded field may also prove relevant to determining when the grant of a patent will pro-
mote allocative efficiency.
175. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
176. In antitrust market analysis, for example, the Department of Justice and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission have proposed defining relevant markets in part by asking whether a
producer may impose a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase of five or perhaps
more or less over a competitive price. See DEP'T OF JUST. & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 1.11 (1997); see also Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v.
Continental Cablevision, 714 F.2d 351, 355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027
(1984) (applying Guidelines approach to define relevant product market); Bon-Ton Stores,
Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 872 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (using Guidelines
approach to define relevant product market).
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two-hundred-dollar product more readily than on a two-dollar product.
7
Consumers are more likely to notice the one dollar mark-up where it
creates a noticeable difference in the price of the product. And having
noticed a sharp price difference, consumers are also more likely to un-
dertake the effort to find the product elsewhere."'
When we turn to creative investments, similar principles apply. One
million dollars may seem like a large creative investment, and it is in
some absolute sense. But if this investment leads to an idea that is then
combined with an additional ninety-nine million dollars in non-creative
investment, an innovator need only charge a price for the resulting
product 1.01 percent higher than what would otherwise be the competi-
tive price in order to recover her creative investment. In contrast, if
investing the same creative resources leads to an idea that is then com-
bined with an additional one million dollars in non-creative investment,
an innovator would need to be able to charge a price 100 percent higher
than the competitive price to recoup her creative investment. Even with
near-perfect competition, an innovator could likely sustain a price 1.01
percent over the perfectly competitive price. 79 On the other hand, so
long as there is any competition at all, an innovator will have trouble
sustaining a 100 percent mark-up. If we are going to think of and ex-
press innovation rents as a percentage over marginal costs, looking at
the creative investment as a similar fraction facilitates a more ready de-
termination of whether the innovation rents available will likely cover
the creative investment entailed.80
Moreover, expressing the creativity investment as a fraction of the
total cost provides a more accurate and more reliable indication of the
innovation rents likely available than the dollar value of the creative
investment alone could provide. As we have seen, the creative invest-
ment fraction suggests the extent to which copying competitors can
undercut the innovator's price. The creative investment fraction there-
fore tends to identify the likely price levels and corresponding rents
available in the post-entry period. The creative investment fraction also
177. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293, 316-17 (1984) (noting that
similar Palo Alto gas stations charged disparate prices for full service and that similar
Washington, D.C., photographers charged disparate prices for passport photos).
178. We can use Professor Kelman's example to illustrate: While gas prices may often
vary a few cents or more between competing stations, gas prices seldom vary by fifty cents
or more.
179. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 177, at 316-17.
180. For example, if we know that innovation rents will run 5 percent over marginal
cost and we know that the creative investment is 4 percent of the total costs, then we can
immediately see that the innovation rents will cover the creative investment without any
need to know the number of units sold, the actual market price, or the absolute magnitudes of
the creative and non-creative investments.
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suggests both how much time a competitor can save by copying the idea
reflected in a new product and how much time a competitor must actu-
ally spend on the physical task of duplicating the tangible product. The
creative investment fraction thus tends to identify an innovator's likely
lead-time advantage. For these reasons, creativity as a fraction of total
cost provides an indication of the likely innovation rents available that
is more reliable than the dollar value of the creative investment on its
own. The creative investment fraction is therefore the better tool for
identifying those cases where granting and enforcing a patent will pro-
mote allocative efficiency.
To apply this tool to resolve the obviousness issue, we need to re-
solve two issues-one factual, the other legal. The first issue is to
determine as a factual matter the actual creative investment as a fraction
of total product cost for the patent claims at issue. 8' One clear advan-
tage of the creative investment fraction approach is that there should be
direct evidence available to establish both the creative resources in-
vested and the resulting product's total costs. 82 Although parties will no
doubt attempt to slant expenditures to create a picture that favors their
perspective, the adversary process should prove capable of creating a
reasonably accurate picture of the actual creativity invested as a fraction
of total product cost. Once the creative investment fraction is deter-
mined as a factual matter, it should then be compared against a legal
standard for the fraction required to satisfy the nonobviousness stan-
dard. If the actual creative investment fraction exceeds the legal
standard, then a strong presumption of nonobviousness would arise. If
the actual expenditure fraction fell below the legal standard, a strong
presumption of obviousness would arise. To account for those inven-
tions that result from "a flash of creative genius," as well as to account
for unusually inefficient inventors or artificially-inflated creative ex-
penditures, parties may attempt to establish that the actual creative
181. Alternatively, we can approximate this fraction by using a creativity invested as a
fraction of market price approach. For this alternative, we would divide the creativity in-
vested by the number of units sold to determine a creativity-per-unit value. We could then
divide this value by the new product's market price to obtain creativity as a fraction of mar-
ket price.
182. If the product is not yet in production, then expected total cost should be used. We
might also use some fixed, three- or five-year amortization period for determining total cost,
rather than attempting to estimate total cost for the life of the new product. Estimating or
calculating total cost will prove far easier for a shorter period, than for the indefinite future,
and so long as we use a consistent amortization period, looking at the creativity invested as a
fraction of the total cost (for a given period) should not introduce undue inaccuracy into the
analysis. Given that lead-time periods, even with patents, are likely to prove short, the crea-
tive investment fraction calculated using a given period of total cost should remain a
reasonably accurate indicator of likely innovation rents in the absence of a patent.
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investment was unreasonably high or unreasonably low given the results
achieved.183 If a party successfully demonstrates that the actual creative
investment was unreasonable, that showing would rebut the initial pre-
sumption regarding obviousness.
To implement this approach to nonobviousness, we also need some
sense for the creative investment fraction that defines the point at which
granting a patent will tend to promote allocative efficiency. On this
question, unfortunately, the issue becomes decidedly less clear. There is
simply no empirical evidence available that examines creative invest-
ment fractions or their role in determining the point at which a patent
becomes necessary to induce desirable invention. Mansfield et al in
their study of patents and imitation costs estimated that an imitator
could begin production of a new product at, on average, 65 percent of
the innovator's costs.' 4 The fact that they could successfully conduct
such a study suggests that the proposed creative investment fraction ap-
proach is feasible. However, their study does not help us determine the
"right" creative investment fraction for separating obvious and nonob-
vious inventions because it considered only costs associated with
"developing and introducing" the product up to the point of
"manufacturing and marketing start-up."'85 The study did not consider
actual production costs and so did not address the point at which the
crossover from sufficient innovation rents without a patent to insuffi-
cient rents would occur.
186
In the absence of empirical evidence that directly addresses this is-
sue, we are left to fall back on our general sense of the economy's
competitiveness. To the extent we believe that the economy is near-
perfectly competitive, then a patent is likely to prove necessary to
induce an invention even where the creativity invested represents only a
183. Of the secondary factors that the Federal Circuit has identified as relevant to the
obviousness issue, I tend generally to agree with Professor Merges' analysis that failure of
others is the most reliable and relevant evidence of a significant technical advance and that
commercial success, licensing, and copying by others are far less reliable and relevant. See
Merges, supra note 36, at 860-73. I would accord somewhat more weight to long-felt, but
unsolved need than Professor Merges. See id. at 872. Failure of others and long-felt need
both tend to establish, although failure of others does so more directly, that solving the
problem represented a difficult or tricky task, and would therefore reasonably entail a sub-
stantial creative investment. Commercial success, licensing, and copying on their own do not
as directly or as persuasively establish that fact.
184. See MANSFIELD ET AL., supra note 153, at 141, 152.
185. Id. at 140.
186. If we consider the creative investment as those resources necessary both to invent
and to innovate, from discovery through initially bringing the product to market, then Mans-
field et al. determined the costs savings available to copying competitors as a fraction of the
creative investment alone, and did not consider the non-creative investment involved in
producing the invention in tangible and marketable form.
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small percentage, perhaps 2 to 4 percent,' of the resulting product's
total costs. On the other hand, to the extent we believe that there are
substantial imperfections in the economy's competitiveness, then a pat-
ent is likely to prove necessary to induce invention only where the
creativity invested represents some more substantial percentage, per-
haps 4 to 8 percent,98' of the resulting product's total costs.
I must admit that these figures are, at this point, simply guesses-
educated guesses perhaps, but guesses nonetheless. The lack of empiri-
cal evidence to resolve this key issue cautions against immediately
adopting the creative investment fraction approach. I say this despite the
fact that the proposed fraction approach better addresses patent law's
underlying purpose and also provides an objective basis for resolving
the nonobviousness issue. Despite these advantages, and in part because
of them, the lack of empirical data persuades me that we should proceed
slowly."9 I would therefore propose, as a first step, that courts formally
recognize the creative investment fraction as a form of objective evi-
dence relevant to the nonobviousness issue."'
Formal recognition of the creative investment fraction as relevant to
the nonobviousness issue would provide an opportunity to develop a
base of empirical data and experience with the creative investment frac-
tion approach. The data collected should help us identify more clearly
the relationship between the creativity investment fraction and the level
of innovation rents available. The data may thereby enable us to deter-
mine the precise creative investment fraction that the nonobviousness
standard should require to support patentability.'9 At the very least,
187. There are likely to be quite radical differences of opinion as to these percentages. I
consider 2 to 4 percent to be a small percentage, in the absence of other evidence, given that
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have proposed defining mar-
kets by looking for 5 percent or perhaps more or less price increases. See supra sources cited
note 176. If five or ten percent price increases are potentially objectionable under antitrust
law, while smaller price increases are unobjectionable, that provides some support for the
proposition that innovation rents of up to 5 percent over marginal cost might be available in
the absence of patent protection.
188. If the economy is not particularly competitive, and as the DOJ and FTC have sug-
gested, 5 to 10 percent price increases are obtainable in the absence of strong competition,
then it seems plausible that innovation rents even without a patent could enable an innovator
to recoup creative investments that account for 4 to 8 percent of the total product cost.
189. Moving too quickly risks failure that could permanently color perception of this
approach.
190. Even in the absence of such formal recognition, such evidence would, for the rea-
sons given in this essay, satisfy Rule 401's relevancy standard on the nonobviousness issue.
As a result, either the patent holder or the alleged infringer (depending on which way the
evidence cuts) should seek to introduce and rely on such evidence to establish the nonobvi-
ousness or the obviousness of the claimed invention.
191. Such experience may also demonstrate that we need and can practically implement
different fractions for different industries. The usual assumption in the literature is that
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such empirical data may help us establish boundaries for patentability,
where, for example, a creative investment fraction below two percent is
presumed obvious, while a creative investment fraction above ten per-
cent is presumed nonobvious. At the same time, parties and courts will
be learning to use and understand the approach. This experience will
help us identify any difficulties associated with the creative investment
fraction and will help us determine whether cases such as serendipitous
invention, where the approach may not directly apply, are likely to
prove sufficiently common to warrant concern.
mH. OBVIOUSNESS AND E-COMMERCE
When we turn to the field of e-commerce more specifically, we are
confronted with the same issues of nonobviousness doctrine and pol-
icy that arise for patents more generally. To begin with, the Federal
Circuit's doctrinal changes to the nonobviousness requirement, and
more importantly, its simply-property perspective mean that the
nonobviousness requirement will not prove, as a general rule under pre-
sent law, a substantial hurdle for e-commerce patents. Doctrinally, both
the elevation of the secondary factors to a central role in the obvious-
ness inquiry and the substitution of the suggestion test for the Court's
synergism test in cases involving combination patents will facilitate in-
dividuals obtaining patents for e-commerce inventions. Although some,
if not most, of the first wave of e-commerce patents involve nothing
more than the application of existing business methods to the Internet
and require only the adaptation of existing technology to a particular use
rather than any true technical advance, most of these patents would
likely survive a nonobviousness challenge under the Federal Circuit's
approach." The elevation of the secondary considerations to a central
role in the nonobviousness inquiry effectively means that anyone who
first moves an existing business to the Internet, obtains a patent thereon,
and then succeeds commercially will have a strong nonobviousness case
almost without regard to the technical advance entailed. Moreover,
where an alleged infringer could once have challenged such a patent as
simply a combination of existing prior art elements that lacks a syner-
patent laws cannot practically be made industry specific. See Michael Waterson, The Eco-
nomics of Product Patents, 80 Ami. EcON. REv. 860, 869 (1990) ("This paper, like many
others concerned with welfare aspects of patents, faces one major problem in drawing con-
clusions: it is hardly likely that patent law can be made industry specific.").
192. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1241-
42 (W.D. Wash. 1999), vacated by 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (granting preliminary
injunction and finding likelihood that Amazon.com's patent on single action method for
shopping on the Internet would not be proven obvious).
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gistic effect, that basis is no longer available. 93 Rather, the alleged in-
fringer would have to establish some prior art teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine the elements. While such suggestion may be
found in some e-commerce cases, e-commerce's rapid advance usually
means that an individual who first sees potential profit in a possible
combination will attempt the combination herself, rather than publishing
the idea for others to attempt.
Prior to the tenure of the Federal Circuit, an alleged infringer could
also argue, as a matter of policy under the traditional view, that the non-
obviousness standard should be strictly enforced because of the risk that
a patent might impose monopoly losses on consumers without any off-
setting public benefit. But the Federal Circuit has rejected the view that
patents are monopolies and would likely reject such policy arguments
(if it did not go further and chastise the attorney for making it). Under
the simply-property perspective, a patent is simply property, not mo-
nopoly, and an individual who creates something new and useful would
seem presumptively entitled to a property right reflecting her contribu-
tion. The Federal Circuit's adoption of this simply-property perspective
on patents will strongly reinforce the barriers to a successful obvious-
ness showing that the Federal Circuit has erected through its doctrinal
changes.
While recent empirical evidence suggests that most litigated patents
will be upheld, there remains considerable uncertainty as to whether a
particular patent in a particular case will be upheld. As discussed, the
Federal Circuit has not always been consistent in applying its nonobvi-
ousness doctrine to particular cases."4 The holder of a patent on an e-
commerce invention can usually expect that so long as the claimed in-
vention (1) represents some advance over the prior art and (2) becomes
a commercial success, her invention will satisfy the nonobviousness
requirement. But demonstrating the presence of some technical advance
plus commercial success has not always been enough to establish non-
obviousness even under the Federal Circuit.'95 Similarly, while the
holder of an e-commerce patent representing a new combination of old
elements can usually expect the Federal Circuit to uphold the patent ab-
sent some prior art suggestion to combine the elements, sometimes the
Federal Circuit will find that the suggestion was implicit in the prior art
or inherent in the problem to be solved.96 As a result, despite the sense
193. At least, it is not available unless and until the Court accepts certiorari on a case
raising the issue and re-establishes the synergism test.
194. See supra text and accompanying notes 116-121.
195. Compare cases cited supra in note 116 with cases cited supra in note 117.
196. Compare cases cited supra in note 118 with cases cited supra in note 119.
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that patents generally are more likely to be upheld under the Federal
Circuit, considerable uncertainty remains over precisely which patents
will be upheld and which patents will not be.
The recent litigation involving Amazon.com's one-click patent for
on-line shopping well illustrates all of these difficulties. 97 Although I do
not necessarily agree that every translation of a real-world activity to the
Internet is obvious, adapting one-click shopping method to the Internet
represented a relatively simple translation presenting few, if any, new
technical challenges. Yet, following the approach to the nonobviousness
issue that the Federal Circuit has established, the district court found that
Amazon.com had a reasonable probability of success on the obviousness
issue and issued a preliminary injunction against Barnesandnoble.com's
similar on-line shopping method.'93 In reaching that conclusion, the dis-
trict court identified several differences between Amazon.com's
claimed invention and the prior art, and then relied on evidence of
commercial success and other "objective factors" to establish that such
differences represented a nonobvious advance.' On appeal, the Federal
Circuit neither reversed nor affirmed. Rather, it vacated the district
court's ruling on the basis that Barnesandnoble.com had raised serious
questions regarding the patent's obviousness.2" The court expressed se-
rious reservations regarding the patent, reciting a number of prior art
references that were very similar, if not identical to the patent claims,
and discounting the evidence of "'secondary considerations"' "in view
of the substantial question of validity raised by the prior art refer-
ences." 20 Yet, even so, the panel was careful to insist that while
Barnesandnoble.com had "mounted a serious challenge to the validity of
Amazon's patent" sufficient to defeat Amazon.com's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, "the ultimate question of invalidity... is a matter
for resolution at trial. 2 2 Through its decision, the Federal Circuit man-
aged to maintain the presumptive validity of a patent that represented a
trivial technical advance, while at the same time creating vast uncer-
tainty regarding the patent's ultimate validity.
When we move beyond a description of what is likely to happen
with e-commerce patents under present law to a consideration of what
should happen, we are confronted with the same question we face for
patents more generally: What is the proper role for the nonobviousness
197. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D.
Wash. 1999), vacated by 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
198. Amazon.Com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. at 1232-37.
199. Id.
200. Amazon.com, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1358-66.
201. Id. at 1360-66 (quoting the district court).
202. Id. at 1360.
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requirement? The traditional perspective identified and assigned nonob-
viousness a central role of separating those inventions where the patent
bargain made sense from those where it did not. In contrast, nonobvi-
ousness appears to have no sensible role under the simply-property
perspective. So long as an advance is new and useful, the grant of a cor-
responding property right would seem appropriate. To restore a sense of
purpose to the nonobviousness requirement and to identify its proper
role under a simply-property perspective, we must examine that per-
spective's normative merits. In doing so, we find that the simply-
property perspective attempts to establish the normative desirability of a
patent by drawing an analogy between patents and other admittedly de-
sirable forms of property. Yet for this analogy to hold, the patent system
must serve, as private ownership more generally serves, to promote the
allocation of scarce resources to their highest value use. By exploring
the relationship between patents and allocative efficiency, we have
identified two key principles for structuring the patent system to pro-
mote allocative efficiency. These principles should apply to e-
commerce patents as well as to patents more generally.
First, to promote allocative efficiency, we should extend patent
protection only to those e-commerce inventions not likely to have oc-
curred but for the expectation of a patent. Although this result accords
with the result reached by the traditional perspective, an allocative effi-
ciency approach does not justify this result by assuming that patents are
monopolies. Rather, it justifies this result by looking at the patent sys-
tem as a property regime intended to allocate scarce resources to their
highest value use. From this perspective, the fear is not that too many e-
commerce patents will lead to undesirable monopoly losses, but that
granting e-commerce patents too readily will lead individuals to devote
their creativity to less valuable creative endeavors. As our model sug-
gests, granting a patent to each new and useful advance in e-commerce
will tend to attract too much creativity to less valuable e-commerce in-
vestments and will thereby starve more valuable e-commerce
investments of the creativity they need.23 In contrast, granting patents
only to those inventions not likely to have occurred but for the expecta-
tion of a patent will tend to promote the allocation of our limited supply
of creativity to its highest value use. We should therefore use the non-
obviousness requirement to extend patent protection only to those
desirable e-commerce inventions that would not likely have occurred
but for the expectation of a patent.
203. See supra pp. 37-38.
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Second, to identify those cases where an invention would not likely
have occurred but for the expectation of a patent, we should focus the
nonobviousness inquiry on the creativity invested as a fraction of the
resulting e-commerce product's total cost. This creative investment
fraction provides a reliable tool for separating those desirable inventions
that would likely have occurred even without a patent from those that
would not have. With use, this creative investment fraction should be-
come a more reliable and certain basis for identifying those cases where
granting or upholding a patent will tend to promote allocative effi-
ciency. Moreover, because it represents a truly objective inquiry, it
should also reduce the uncertainty associated with the nonobviousness
standard.
For e-commerce patents, as for patents more generally, following
these two principles largely reconciles the traditional and simply-
property perspectives and enables us to define a sensible and central
role for the nonobviousness standard within the patent system. Follow-
ing these two principles should also significantly improve the patent
system's ability to ensure that the creative resources available for e-
commerce are allocated to their highest value use. Finally, by re-
creating the patent system as a tool to promote allocative efficiency,
following these two principles will enable a patent to lay justifiable
claim to the label "simply property."
